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From	  Developmental	  State	  to	  Autonomy:	  The	  politics	  of	  business	  associations	  in	  Taiwan	  and	  South	  Korea	  Abstract:	  This	  paper	  explores	  the	  transformation	  of	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan.	  I	  would	  explore	  how	  the	  state,	  capital,	  and	  labor	  respond	  to	  the	  currents	  of	  democratization	  and	  economic	  liberalization	  and	  how	  the	  interaction	  between	  these	  parties	  shaped	  the	  incentives	  and	  organizational	  costs	  of	  business	  interest	  organization.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  divergence	  in	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan.	  We	  see	  that	  the	  businesses	  in	  South	  Korea	  have	  developed	  a	  rather	  centralized	  network	  of	  business	  association,	  while	  the	  business	  interest	  organization	  has	  become	  increasingly	  pluralistic	  in	  Taiwan.	  The	  empirical	  research	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  would	  explore	  the	  reasons	  behind	  such	  divergence.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  labor	  militancy,	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  economic	  restructuring,	  and	  the	  different	  pattern	  of	  party	  politics	  are	  the	  causes	  of	  such	  differences.	  	  
	  
Introduction	  	  	  	  	  There	  have	  been	  great	  insights	  and	  attention	  around	  business	  association	  in	  the	  field	  of	  political	  economy	  recently.	  Scholars	  of	  political	  economy	  have	  started	  to	  realize	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  role	  of	  business	  associations	  and	  how	  their	  roles	  affect	  productivity	  and	  national	  comparative	  advantage	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  universality	  and	  coverage	  of	  welfare	  policies	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  The	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism	  literature	  for	  instance	  suggests	  that	  economies	  with	  non-­‐market	  coordination	  facilitate	  high-­‐value	  added	  manufacturing,	  long-­‐term	  investment,	  and	  incremental	  innovation	  (Hall	  and	  Soskice	  2001).	  Others	  suggest	  that	  an	  encompassing	  peak	  business	  association	  creates	  a	  platform	  for	  the	  exchange	  of	  policy	  ideas	  and	  facilitates	  policy	  consensus	  for	  more	  equal	  and	  universal	  welfare	  policies	  (Martin	  and	  Swank	  2001).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  see	  that	  the	  literature	  concerning	  the	  role	  of	  business	  association	  and	  business	  coordination	  in	  the	  political	  economy	  has	  been	  growing.	  However,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  role	  of	  business	  associations	  is	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rather	  limited.	  With	  a	  few	  exceptions,	  most	  of	  the	  analyses	  study	  advanced	  industrialized	  countries	  like	  the	  United	  States,	  Western	  European	  states,	  and	  Japan.	  Analysis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  business	  coordination	  and	  business	  organization	  in	  the	  economy	  is	  very	  limited	  in	  the	  newly-­‐industrializing	  countries	  (NIC).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  of	  such	  scarcity	  is	  that	  political	  economists	  focusing	  on	  developing	  countries	  emphasize	  more	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  economic	  development	  and	  industrialization.	  The	  success	  story	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  NICs,	  especially	  South	  Korea,	  Taiwan,	  and	  Singapore	  was	  thoroughly	  studied	  (See	  Wade	  1990,	  Woo-­‐Cumings	  1999,	  Amsden	  1989,	  Evans	  1995).	  In	  particular,	  scholars	  largely	  acknowledge	  how	  the	  entrepreneurial	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  economic	  governance,	  export	  promotion,	  technological	  transfer,	  socialization	  of	  investment	  risks,	  direction	  of	  investment,	  or	  even	  repression	  of	  labor	  to	  the	  rapid	  growth	  in	  East	  Asia.	  Many	  connect	  the	  sustainable	  economic	  development	  and	  successful	  industrial	  upgrading	  with	  the	  developmental	  state,	  with	  a	  highly	  autonomous	  and	  embedded	  bureaucracy	  (Evans	  1995).	  The	  political	  economic	  analysis	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  tends	  to	  lean	  towards	  the	  developmental	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  economic	  development	  has	  been	  crucial	  to	  the	  East	  Asian	  growing	  economies.	  Yet	  we	  should	  remind	  ourselves	  that	  much	  have	  changed	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  especially	  in	  East	  Asia.	  Globalization	  has	  pressured	  the	  states	  to	  lift	  controls	  of	  interest	  rates,	  exchange	  rates,	  entry	  of	  foreign	  competitors,	  and	  capital	  flows.	  Many	  of	  the	  industrial	  policies	  and	  economic	  policy	  tools	  are	  no	  longer	  applicable	  in	  the	  increasingly	  globalized	  market.	  More	  importantly,	  many	  of	  these	  countries	  have	  undergone	  a	  process	  of	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democratic	  transition.	  Democratization	  has	  weakened	  the	  authority	  and	  power	  of	  the	  developmental	  state,	  in	  particular	  the	  powerful	  planning	  agencies	  and	  economic	  bureaucracy.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  with	  the	  liberalization	  of	  the	  financial	  market,	  businesses	  are	  more	  independent	  and	  autonomous.	  We	  can	  expect	  that	  the	  state	  can	  play	  a	  relative	  smaller	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  business	  actors	  should	  be	  more	  independent	  and	  more	  capable	  in	  coordinating	  collective	  actions.	  	  	  	  	  	  Given	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  changes	  I	  mentioned	  above,	  we	  might	  have	  the	  following	  questions	  concerning	  the	  NICs	  in	  East	  Asia:	  What	  happens	  to	  the	  business	  associations	  in	  these	  East	  Asian	  NICs?	  How	  are	  business	  associations	  transformed	  after	  industrialists	  broke	  off	  the	  control	  and	  dependence	  of	  the	  state	  after	  economic	  liberalization	  and	  democratization?	  How	  are	  business	  organized	  and	  coordinated	  and	  how	  does	  coordination	  affect	  comparative	  advantage	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  development	  of	  social	  policies?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  paper	  attempts	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  questions.	  Democratization	  and	  economic	  liberalization	  have	  created	  new	  incentives	  and	  needs	  for	  interest	  organization,	  particularly	  business	  interest	  organization.	  Democratization	  changed	  the	  power	  relations	  between	  the	  state,	  capital,	  labor,	  and	  society.	  Such	  power	  reallocation,	  I	  argue,	  changed	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  business	  community	  to	  organize	  and	  participate	  in	  collective	  actions.	  Also,	  the	  current	  of	  economic	  liberalization	  changed	  the	  state-­‐business	  relations,	  and	  such	  realignment	  of	  state-­‐business	  relations	  would	  create	  new	  incentives	  and	  directions	  for	  business	  relations.	  The	  first	  objective	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  transformation	  of	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan.	  I	  would	  explore	  how	  the	  state,	  capital,	  and	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labor	  respond	  to	  the	  currents	  of	  democratization	  and	  economic	  liberalization	  and	  how	  the	  interaction	  between	  these	  parties	  shaped	  the	  incentives	  and	  organizational	  costs	  of	  business	  interest	  organization.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  second	  question	  I	  would	  like	  to	  address	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  that,	  do	  we	  see	  a	  convergence	  in	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  these	  post-­‐developmentalist	  countries?	  We	  expect	  that	  countries	  with	  a	  state-­‐corporatist	  interest	  organizational	  structure	  would	  gradually	  transform	  into	  a	  societal	  corporatist	  form	  of	  interest	  representation.	  However,	  my	  empirical	  research	  suggests	  the	  contrary.	  Despite	  the	  similarities	  between	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  developmentalist	  era,	  we	  see	  a	  divergence	  in	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan.	  Businesses	  in	  South	  Korea	  have	  developed	  a	  rather	  centralized	  network	  of	  business	  association,	  while	  the	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  Taiwan	  has	  become	  increasingly	  pluralistic	  in	  Taiwan.	  We	  see	  a	  centralized	  peak	  trade	  association,	  the	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  Industries	  (FKI),	  and	  a	  centralized	  employers	  association,	  the	  KEF	  (Korean	  Employers	  Federation)	  was	  established	  and	  empowered	  in	  South	  Korea.	  In	  contrast,	  there	  are	  six	  peak	  associations,	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  Industries	  (NFI),	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  Commerce	  (NFC),	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Industry	  and	  Commerce	  (NCIC),	  the	  China	  National	  Association	  of	  Industrial	  and	  Commerce	  (CNAIC),	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Small-­‐and-­‐Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises	  (NASME)	  in	  Taiwan.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  empirical	  research	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  would	  explore	  the	  reasons	  behind	  such	  divergence.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  labor	  militancy,	  the	  difference	  in	  the	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politics	  of	  economic	  restructuring,	  and	  the	  different	  pattern	  of	  party	  politics	  are	  the	  causes	  of	  such	  differences.	  	  	  	  	  The	  paper	  will	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  major	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  literature	  review	  on	  the	  studies	  related	  to	  business	  interest	  organization,	  focusing	  on	  the	  functions	  of	  business	  associations,	  the	  cross-­‐national	  differences	  of	  business	  associations,	  and	  the	  possible	  reasons	  accounting	  for	  such	  differences.	  In	  the	  second	  part,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  process	  of	  transformation	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan.	  The	  case	  study	  section	  will	  be	  subdivided	  into	  three	  parts:	  first,	  the	  initial	  conditions	  of	  social	  control	  and	  economic	  development,	  second	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  environment,	  and	  third,	  the	  response	  of	  business	  and	  state	  actors	  to	  these	  changes	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  business	  associations	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  At	  the	  end,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  comparison	  and	  conclusion.	  	  	  
Literature	  Review	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  literature	  review	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  business	  interest	  organization.	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  review	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  major	  functions	  and	  utilities	  of	  business	  associations.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  review,	  I	  will	  enumerate	  on	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  business	  interest	  organization.	  In	  the	  third	  section,	  I	  will	  present	  the	  dominant	  reasons	  behind	  the	  cross-­‐national	  difference	  in	  business	  interest	  organization:	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  impact	  of	  state,	  party	  and	  labor	  actors.	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I.	  Why	  do	  Business	  Actors	  organize?	  Collective	  Benefits	  and	  Functions	  of	  
Business	  Associations	  	  	  	  	  All	  collective	  actions	  involve	  a	  common	  good.	  Understanding	  the	  common	  good	  of	  and	  the	  initial	  incentives	  for	  the	  collective	  action	  would	  help	  us	  understand	  the	  politics	  of	  business	  mobilization	  and	  the	  transition	  of	  business	  interest	  from	  the	  developmental	  authoritarian	  era	  to	  the	  democratic	  era.	  	  	  	  	  	  Businesses	  organize	  for	  two	  types	  of	  benefits:	  economic	  and	  social.	  As	  Windmuller	  and	  Gladstone	  suggest,	  there	  are	  two	  major	  types	  of	  business	  associations,	  one	  is	  employer	  associations,	  which	  specialize	  in	  labor-­‐related	  or	  social	  issues,	  and	  the	  other	  is	  trade	  associations,	  which	  specialize	  in	  economic	  collective	  actions	  (Windmuller	  and	  Gladstone	  1984).	  For	  the	  trade	  associations,	  Doner	  and	  Schneider	  further	  divide	  them	  into	  market	  supporting	  functions	  and	  market	  complementary	  functions	  (Doner	  and	  Schneider	  2000).	  Market	  supporting	  activities	  are	  more	  common	  in	  developing	  countries	  where	  business	  associations	  are	  involved	  in	  strengthening	  the	  overall	  functioning	  of	  the	  market	  by	  supporting	  the	  provision	  of	  basic	  public	  goods	  including	  strong	  property	  rights,	  effective	  public	  administration,	  and	  infrastructure.	  Trade	  associations	  in	  developing	  countries	  sometimes	  lobby	  for	  better	  infrastructure,	  petition	  against	  state	  predation	  and	  infringement	  of	  property	  rights,	  and	  pressure	  for	  the	  improvement	  of	  bureaucratic	  capacity	  and	  efficiency	  that	  facilitates	  industrial	  growth	  and	  increase	  in	  productivity	  (Doner	  and	  Schneider	  2000).	  	  	  	  	  	  Market	  complementary	  activities	  involve	  in	  market-­‐simulating	  activities,	  many	  of	  which	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  without	  collective	  actions	  and	  coordination	  among	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business	  actors.	  Market	  complementary	  activities	  include	  macro-­‐economic	  coordination	  like	  income	  policies	  as	  well	  as	  horizontal	  coordination	  like	  monitoring,	  entry	  control,	  recession	  cartels,	  quality	  control	  of	  exports,	  standardization,	  joint	  research	  and	  development	  projects,	  collective	  vocational	  training,	  standard	  setting,	  technological	  transfer	  (Doner	  and	  Schneider	  2000).	  	  	  	  	  	  Employer	  associations,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  involved	  in	  stabilizing	  and	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  one	  factor	  of	  production:	  labor.	  Employers	  organize	  collective	  actions	  and	  foster	  consensus	  on	  labor	  related	  issues	  and	  represents	  the	  business	  community	  in	  general	  in	  the	  media	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  labor	  policies,	  vocational	  training,	  and	  social	  welfare.	  (Gladstone	  and	  Windmuller	  1984).	  	  	  
II.	  Business	  association	  and	  coordination:	  A	  Typology	  	  	  	  	  	  Although	  all	  business	  actors	  have	  common	  benefits	  in	  organizing	  and	  creating	  business	  associations,	  there	  are	  different	  structures	  of	  business	  organization	  in	  different	  countries.	  Business	  associations	  differ	  not	  only	  in	  organizational	  structure,	  but	  also	  in	  their	  level	  of	  collective	  action.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  differences	  of	  organizational	  structure	  and	  coordination	  among	  business	  associations.	  	  	  
1.	  Organizational	  structure	  of	  interest	  Groups:	  Philippe	  Schmitter’s	  framework	  	  	  	  	  	  Large	  interest	  groups	  like	  business	  associations	  and	  labor	  unions	  could	  have	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  members,	  with	  subsidiary	  unions	  and	  associations	  in	  different	  regional	  areas	  and	  sectors.	  To	  manage	  such	  complex	  network,	  a	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sophisticated	  organizational	  structure	  is	  needed.	  Understanding	  the	  organizational	  structure	  between	  the	  discrete	  interest	  groups,	  thus,	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  the	  function	  and	  organizational	  strength	  of	  the	  network	  of	  business	  associations.	  	  	  	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  widely	  cited	  works	  on	  organizational	  structure	  of	  interest	  groups	  is	  probably	  Philippe	  Schmitter’s	  Still	  the	  Century	  of	  Corporatism.	  Schmitter	  considers	  business	  representation	  as	  a	  system	  and	  analyzes	  institutional	  structure	  of	  interest	  representation	  based	  on	  five	  categories:	  monopoly,	  choice	  of	  entry,	  competitiveness,	  hierarchy,	  and	  functional	  differentiation.	  For	  Schmitter,	  there	  are	  two	  ideal	  models	  of	  interest	  representational	  system:	  pluralist	  and	  corporatist.	  Pluralist	  system	  consists	  of	  multiple,	  competitive,	  functionally	  similar	  associations.	  In	  a	  pluralist	  system,	  firms	  can	  choose	  to	  join	  and	  exit	  the	  associations	  at	  will	  since	  there	  are	  little	  restrictions	  to	  entry	  and	  exit.	  Under	  a	  pluralist	  system,	  there	  is	  competition	  among	  the	  associations	  for	  memberships,	  since	  the	  function	  of	  the	  associations	  overlaps	  and	  each	  association	  tries	  to	  maximize	  its	  membership	  to	  enhance	  its	  influence	  in	  the	  business	  community	  and	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  There	  are	  usually	  multiple	  centers	  in	  such	  interest	  representational	  system	  and	  the	  national	  level	  associations	  have	  little	  authority	  over	  the	  lower	  level	  associations	  (Schmitter	  1979).	  	  	  	  	  A	  corporatist	  system	  is	  a	  mirror	  opposition	  to	  the	  pluralist	  system,	  consisting	  of	  singular,	  non-­‐competitive,	  functionally	  differentiated	  associations.	  Membership	  is	  compulsory	  and	  the	  associations	  are	  hierarchically	  ordered.	  The	  state	  grants	  monopoly	  of	  representation	  to	  associations	  on	  all	  levels,	  thus	  associations	  do	  not	  overlap	  functionally.	  There	  is	  usually	  a	  centralized	  decision	  making	  body	  and	  the	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associations	  in	  the	  lower	  strata	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  have	  to	  respect	  the	  decision	  from	  above	  since	  the	  exit	  cost	  is	  usually	  high	  (Schmitter	  1979).	  	  
	  
2.	  Variety	  of	  Corporatism	  and	  Business	  Coordination	  	  
i.	  State	  versus	  societal	  corporatism	  	  	  	  	  As	  we	  see	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  business	  interest	  organization	  can	  be	  classified	  based	  on	  the	  singularity,	  functional	  differentiation,	  and	  hierarchy.	  Interest	  representational	  systems	  usually	  fall	  into	  the	  categories	  of	  pluralism	  and	  corporatism.	  While	  scholars	  find	  cross-­‐national	  differences	  between	  different	  pluralist	  systems	  are	  insignificant,	  they	  see	  significant	  cross-­‐national	  differences	  among	  the	  corporatist	  interest	  organizational	  systems.	  	  	  	  	  The	  first	  difference	  is	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  business	  association	  and	  the	  immunity	  from	  state	  influence	  and	  manipulation.	  Schmitter	  differentiates	  the	  societal	  corporatist	  model	  from	  the	  state	  corporatist	  model	  based	  on	  the	  source	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  network	  of	  business	  associations	  since	  there	  are	  systems	  where	  business	  associations	  are	  not	  totally	  independent	  from	  the	  state.	  For	  the	  societal	  corporatist	  system,	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  polity	  lies	  in	  the	  delegation	  of	  power	  to	  the	  autonomous	  interest	  representational	  groups.	  The	  state	  forms	  a	  partnership	  with	  the	  business	  associations	  and	  has	  little	  direct	  influence	  over	  their	  decision,	  organization,	  and	  activities.	  	  	  	  	  	  Yet	  for	  the	  state-­‐corporatist	  system,	  since	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  lies	  elsewhere,	  the	  state	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  manipulate	  business	  associations	  in	  the	  polity.	  In	  most	  cases,	  the	  polity	  is	  ruled	  under	  an	  authoritarian	  state,	  and	  the	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legitimacy	  of	  the	  government	  is	  usually	  enhanced	  by	  the	  state’s	  sponsorship	  of	  social	  organizations.	  The	  state,	  instead	  of	  delegating	  power	  to	  the	  societal	  partners,	  incorporates	  them	  into	  the	  state	  apparatus	  for	  social	  control	  and	  manipulation	  (Schmitter	  1979).	  Such	  differentiation	  will	  be	  important	  in	  our	  analysis.	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  authoritarian	  regime,	  both	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  fit	  into	  this	  category	  before	  democratization	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  Business	  and	  labor	  interest	  groups	  were	  functionally	  differentiated,	  monopolistic,	  and	  hierarchically	  ordered	  but	  had	  little	  autonomy	  and	  independence.	  	  	  
ii.	  macro-­‐,	  meso-­‐,	  and	  micro-­‐corporatism	  	  	  	  	  Another	  difference	  between	  different	  business	  organizational	  systems	  is	  the	  level	  in	  which	  business	  coordination	  takes	  place.	  Based	  on	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  business	  coordination,	  scholars	  classify	  corporatist	  business	  coordination	  into	  three	  types:	  macro-­‐corporatism,	  meso-­‐corporatism,	  and	  micro-­‐corporatism	  (Martin	  and	  Thelen	  2007;	  Grant	  1985;	  Streeck	  1995)	  Macro-­‐corporatist	  coordination	  involves	  national	  level	  coordination	  between	  state,	  business,	  and	  labor.	  In	  this	  case,	  business	  interests	  are	  organized	  in	  a	  centralized,	  encompassing	  peak	  association.	  The	  peak	  association	  represents	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  entire	  business	  class	  and	  bargains	  with	  state	  and	  labor	  actors	  in	  the	  national	  level.	  The	  prominent	  example	  of	  macro-­‐corporatism	  is	  Sweden,	  where	  there	  are	  institutions	  like	  national	  level	  tripartite	  policy	  consultation	  as	  well	  as	  centralized	  wage	  bargaining	  (Swenson	  2002;	  Martin	  and	  Thelen	  2007).	  	  	  	  	  Meso-­‐corporatism	  involves	  mainly	  sectorial	  coordination	  including	  industrial	  level	  wage	  bargaining	  and	  vocational	  training.	  The	  prominent	  example	  of	  meso-­‐
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corporatism	  is	  Germany.	  While	  the	  national	  level	  corporatist	  apparatus	  still	  exists,	  much	  of	  the	  coordination	  are	  done	  at	  the	  industrial	  level	  (Martin	  and	  Thelen	  2007)	  	  	  	  	  As	  for	  micro-­‐corporatism,	  coordination	  takes	  place	  at	  the	  enterprise	  level.	  Institutions	  like	  the	  Work	  Council	  in	  Germany,	  Shingikai	  in	  Japan	  are	  prominent	  examples	  of	  such	  corporatist	  coordination.	  At	  the	  firm	  level,	  employer	  and	  labor	  representatives	  sit	  together	  and	  collective	  decide	  matters	  concerning	  productivity,	  employment,	  and	  benefits	  (Streeck	  1995;	  Lee	  1995).	  	  Micro-­‐corporatist	  coordination	  usually	  is	  not	  mutually	  exclusive	  to	  macro	  or	  meso-­‐corporatist	  coordination.	  In	  cases	  like	  Germany,	  we	  see	  meso-­‐corporatism	  and	  micro-­‐corporatism	  coexist	  in	  the	  political	  economy.	  	  	  
	  
III.	  Accounts	  for	  the	  Varieties	  of	  Business	  Interest	  Organization	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  first	  section	  of	  the	  literature	  review,	  I	  laid	  out	  the	  collective	  goods	  that	  business	  actors	  pursue	  and	  in	  the	  second	  section	  I	  enlisted	  the	  differences	  of	  business	  coordination.	  The	  question	  then	  is	  why	  are	  there	  different	  forms	  of	  interest	  representation?	  What	  accounts	  for	  the	  differences	  of	  interest	  representation?	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  mainstream	  explanations	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  business	  interest	  organization,	  with	  the	  focus	  in	  organizational	  strength	  of	  labor	  and	  the	  different	  state	  activities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1.	  State	  action	  and	  Business	  Interest	  Organization	  	  	  	  	  The	  first	  reason	  that	  accounts	  for	  the	  variance	  of	  organizational	  structure	  and	  strength	  is	  that	  different	  countries	  historically	  experienced	  a	  different	  form	  of	  state	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intervention	  in	  interest	  group	  formation.	  Political	  scientists	  like	  Martin,	  Schneider,	  and	  Swank	  suggest	  that	  the	  state	  actors	  can	  lower	  the	  organizational	  cost	  and	  provide	  selective	  benefits	  to	  keep	  staying	  in	  the	  association.	  As	  Olson	  suggests,	  there	  is	  an	  organizational	  cost	  in	  collective	  action.	  Forming	  the	  organization	  in	  the	  beginning	  is	  costly.	  Besides,	  there	  are	  costs	  of	  communication,	  costs	  of	  bargaining,	  or	  simply	  costs	  of	  searching	  (Olson	  1965).	  State	  and	  party	  actors	  can	  lower	  the	  organizational	  cost	  by	  directly	  involved	  in	  mobilization	  and	  communication	  among	  business	  actors.	  	  	  
i.	  The	  state	  and	  political	  parties	  as	  a	  mobilizer	  of	  the	  business	  class	  	  	  	  	  	  First,	  state	  actors	  in	  the	  developmental	  state	  would	  actively	  organize	  businesses	  to	  gather	  necessary	  market	  and	  industrial	  data	  and	  information	  for	  developmental	  plans.	  The	  state	  officials	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  too	  costly	  to	  collect	  the	  economic	  data	  all	  by	  the	  bureaucrats	  themselves.	  Instead,	  the	  cost	  of	  organizing	  business	  is	  lower	  and	  the	  payoff	  for	  the	  mobilization	  effort	  might	  be	  more	  enduring	  in	  the	  long	  term..	  Thus,	  state	  actors	  would	  actively	  organize	  business	  associations	  and	  lower	  the	  organization	  cost	  of	  business	  associations	  (Schneider	  2004;	  Noble	  2000).	  	  Thus	  the	  differences	  in	  business	  associations	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  economic	  conditions	  and	  political	  interest	  of	  the	  developmental	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  Besides,	  political	  parties	  would	  contribute	  to	  lower	  the	  cost	  of	  business	  associations	  in	  exchange	  for	  electoral	  support.	  According	  to	  Swank	  and	  Martin,	  in	  a	  parliamentary	  democracy,	  the	  rightist	  party	  usually	  has	  the	  incentives	  to	  organize	  the	  peak	  business	  associations	  because	  by	  doing	  so,	  it	  would	  create	  a	  long-­‐term	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electoral	  base	  for	  the	  party.	  Political	  parties,	  in	  particular	  the	  rightist	  party	  would	  lower	  the	  organizational	  cost	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  business	  associations	  (Martin	  and	  Swank	  2008)	  Such	  mechanism	  works	  well	  in	  a	  proportional	  representational	  electoral	  system,	  where	  the	  political	  parties	  are	  not	  always	  catch-­‐all	  parties	  but	  instead	  focus	  on	  a	  particular	  group	  of	  voters.	  	  	  	  	  	  Party	  politics,	  however,	  is	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword.	  Political	  parties	  in	  a	  proportional	  representational	  electoral	  system	  tends	  to	  be	  a	  cohesive	  force	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  business	  association,	  yet	  in	  a	  majoritarian	  system,	  party	  politics	  tends	  to	  be	  the	  divisive	  force.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  since	  parties	  are	  catch-­‐all	  parties,	  once	  a	  central	  business	  association	  is	  created	  by	  one	  party,	  the	  opposition	  party	  would	  create	  another	  competing	  organization	  so	  to	  have	  a	  share	  of	  the	  votes	  among	  the	  business	  class	  (Martin	  and	  Swank	  2008).	  The	  political	  parties	  in	  a	  democratic	  system	  could	  lower	  the	  organizational	  cost	  of	  business	  associations,	  yet	  it	  could	  also	  alter	  the	  organizational	  strategy	  of	  businesses,	  making	  interest	  groups	  politics	  pluralistic	  and	  fragmental.	  	  
ii.	  State	  as	  a	  provider	  of	  selective	  benefits	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	  only	  can	  the	  state	  facilitate	  business	  interest	  organization	  by	  lowering	  the	  organizational	  cost,	  it	  can	  do	  so	  by	  providing	  selective	  incentives	  to	  motivate	  businesses	  to	  join	  and	  stay	  in	  the	  business	  associations.	  As	  Olson	  suggests,	  although	  there	  is	  a	  common	  interest	  among	  members	  for	  the	  collective	  benefits,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  common	  interest	  to	  pay	  the	  cost.	  Firms	  as	  utility	  maximizers,	  tend	  to	  free	  ride	  and	  evade	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  collective	  actions.	  Because	  of	  such	  free-­‐rider	  problem,	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collective	  actions	  are	  possible	  only	  when	  selective	  incentives	  are	  provided.	  (Olson	  1965).	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  providing	  selective	  incentives	  to	  members	  of	  the	  business	  associations,	  the	  state	  increases	  the	  incentives	  for	  firms	  to	  join	  the	  business	  associations,	  and	  thus	  increased	  the	  representational	  power	  and	  organizational	  capacity	  of	  the	  business	  associations.	  For	  example,	  the	  state	  can	  limit	  state	  subsidies,	  import	  rebate,	  or	  other	  benefits	  only	  to	  members	  of	  business	  associations,	  or	  provide	  an	  exclusive	  opportunity	  for	  business-­‐state	  talk	  to	  the	  association	  (Schneider	  2004).	  The	  supply	  of	  these	  collective	  goods	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  not	  limited	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  business	  association,	  since	  the	  association	  is	  not	  the	  provider	  of	  such	  benefits.	  Under	  this	  mechanism,	  the	  state	  can	  alter	  the	  incentive	  scheme	  of	  business	  actors	  to	  join	  and	  participate	  in	  business	  associations.	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  lowering	  organizational	  costs	  or	  providing	  selective	  benefits	  to	  members,	  the	  state	  actors	  could	  boost	  the	  membership	  and	  participation	  of	  business	  association.	  The	  politics	  of	  economic	  development	  or	  party	  competition	  can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  business	  associations.	  	  	  	  
iii.	  State-­‐business	  confrontation	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  business	  organization	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  Schneider	  suggests,	  sometimes	  the	  state	  itself	  is	  direct	  cause	  of	  business	  mobilization.	  Sometimes,	  the	  business	  sector	  is	  forced	  to	  organize	  to	  counteract	  the	  business-­‐hostile	  policies	  like	  expropriation	  of	  private	  property,	  unfavorable	  corporate	  taxes,	  and	  pro-­‐labor	  wage	  policies	  (Schneider	  2004).	  When	  the	  business	  community	  believes	  that	  their	  interest	  is	  at	  stake,	  they	  organize	  pressure	  groups	  to	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fight	  for	  their	  interest,	  and	  invest	  in	  the	  organizations	  to	  improve	  their	  public	  image	  in	  the	  media	  (Schneider	  2004;	  Windmuller	  and	  Gladston	  1984).	  	  
iv.	  State	  as	  a	  provider	  of	  common	  goods	  for	  businesses	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	  the	  state	  can	  diminish	  the	  incentive	  for	  business	  to	  organize	  by	  directly	  providing	  collective	  goods	  that	  the	  business	  sector	  wanted.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  newly-­‐industrializing	  countries	  (NICs)	  in	  East	  Asia.	  During	  the	  developmental	  period	  of	  these	  countries,	  the	  state	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  guiding	  and	  directing	  the	  economic	  development	  and	  industrialization	  of	  the	  nation.	  Wade	  calls	  the	  strategy	  a	  “market	  governing”	  strategy.	  The	  developmental	  state	  has	  an	  embedded	  and	  autonomous	  bureaucratic	  apparatus	  and	  it	  is	  active	  in	  planning,	  allocation	  of	  financial	  resources,	  socialization	  of	  investment	  risk	  in	  industrialization	  (Wade	  1990;	  Evans	  1995;	  Amsden	  1989;	  Woo-­‐Cumings	  1999).	  The	  state	  is	  also	  involved	  in	  price	  and	  market	  distortion	  to	  create	  favorable	  conditions	  for	  industrial	  development	  (Amsden	  1989).	  The	  state	  artificially	  alters	  the	  price	  of	  factors	  of	  production	  like	  labor	  and	  capital	  by	  repression	  of	  labor	  movement	  and	  workers’	  wage,	  or	  by	  manipulation	  of	  interest	  rates,	  exchange	  rates.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  developmental	  state	  is	  also	  deeply	  involved	  in	  providing	  common	  goods	  for	  industrialization.	  For	  example,	  the	  state	  is	  involved	  in	  technological	  transfer,	  standardization,	  control	  in	  market	  entry,	  and	  skill	  formation	  (Wade	  1990,	  Amsden	  1989,	  Woo-­‐Cumings	  1999,	  Noble	  2000).	  	  Such	  provisions	  market	  simulating,	  thus	  are	  beneficial	  to	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  business	  community.	  Yet	  the	  provision	  of	  these	  common	  goods	  also	  pre-­‐empted	  the	  efforts	  of	  collective	  actions	  of	  the	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business	  community.	  Organization	  for	  market	  supporting	  and	  market	  complementing	  collective	  goods	  might	  not	  be	  necessary	  under	  an	  effective	  developmental	  state,	  with	  an	  embedded	  and	  autonomous	  bureaucracy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  it	  is	  shown	  above,	  state	  actors	  and	  political	  parties	  can	  facilitate	  the	  formation	  of	  peak	  associations	  by	  lowering	  the	  organizational	  costs	  and	  providing	  selective	  benefits	  for	  the	  business	  associations.	  Yet	  the	  mobilization	  effort	  is	  conditional	  to	  the	  developmental	  interest	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  electoral	  interest	  of	  the	  party.	  Political	  actors	  do	  not	  always	  have	  the	  incentives	  to	  create	  an	  encompassing	  business	  organization.	  Besides,	  the	  state	  sometimes	  creates	  negative	  incentives	  for	  businesses	  to	  organize.	  Infringement	  on	  private	  property,	  pro-­‐labor	  policies,	  or	  the	  purge	  of	  the	  business	  class	  can	  all	  pressure	  the	  business	  sector	  to	  invest	  in	  business	  association	  to	  fight	  for	  their	  interest.	  Yet	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  the	  state	  is	  too	  accommodative	  to	  the	  industrialists,	  the	  business	  community	  might	  lose	  incentives	  to	  participate	  in	  business	  association	  since	  the	  collective	  goods	  are	  directly	  provided	  by	  the	  state.	  Nevertheless,	  political	  actors	  had	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  encompassing	  business	  associations.	  The	  policies	  and	  activities	  of	  the	  state	  shape	  the	  incentives	  for	  businesses	  to	  organize	  and	  alter	  the	  cost	  and	  benefits	  of	  collective	  actions	  of	  the	  businesses.	  	  	  
II.	  Organized	  Labor	  and	  Business	  Association	  	  	  	  	  	  Another	  reason	  that	  business	  organizes	  is	  to	  confront	  organized	  labor.	  Scholars	  like	  Stephens	  suggest	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  labor	  organization	  is	  correlated	  to	  the	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solidarity	  of	  employers	  (Stephens	  1979).	  Crouch	  suggests	  that	  historically,	  encompassing	  business	  association	  emerged	  in	  countries	  with	  stronger	  and	  more	  unified	  labor	  movement	  and	  unions	  (Crouch	  1993).	  When	  labor	  is	  strong	  and	  united,	  the	  working	  class	  has	  more	  bargaining	  power	  and	  could	  interrupt	  production	  to	  a	  greater	  extent.	  Workers	  demand	  higher	  wages,	  benefits,	  and	  better	  working	  conditions,	  and	  threaten	  to	  strike	  when	  employers	  fail	  to	  meet	  their	  demands.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Employers	  organize	  to	  collectively	  confront	  strikes	  and	  conduct	  collective	  bargaining	  with	  the	  labor	  unions.	  Employers	  organize	  to	  create	  consensus	  on	  labor	  policies	  and	  share	  labor	  market	  information.	  Besides,	  it	  represents	  the	  employers	  to	  collectively	  bargain	  with	  the	  state	  and	  with	  the	  labor	  unions	  on	  issues	  like	  wages,	  benefits,	  labor	  laws,	  and	  unionization	  (Gladstone	  and	  Windmuller	  1984).	  	  	  	  	  The	  strength	  of	  labor	  militancy	  varies	  in	  different	  countries	  because	  of	  different	  historical	  reasons.	  King	  suggests	  that	  the	  ethnic	  cleavages	  could	  create	  a	  divided	  working	  class	  (King	  2005).	  Manow	  and	  Van	  Kersbergen	  suggest	  that	  the	  religious	  difference	  in	  the	  society	  could	  undermine	  the	  solidarity	  of	  the	  labor	  movement	  (Manow	  and	  Van	  Kersbergen	  2007).	  Power	  resource	  theorist	  like	  Korpi	  suggests	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  leftist	  parties	  would	  affect	  the	  organizational	  strength	  of	  labor	  (Korpi	  1980).	  One	  can	  enlist	  more	  historical,	  social,	  and	  political	  reasons	  accounting	  for	  the	  different	  strength	  and	  social	  impact	  of	  labor	  activism	  in	  different	  countries,	  but	  the	  key	  issue	  here	  is	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  organized	  labor	  shapes	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  businesses	  to	  organize	  and	  conduct	  collective	  actions.	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  The	  incentives	  for	  businesses	  to	  coordinate	  and	  organize	  employers	  association	  depend,	  as	  suggested	  above,	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  organized	  labor.	  The	  stronger	  the	  union	  movement	  is,	  the	  more	  likely	  the	  industrialists	  of	  the	  country	  to	  organize	  themselves	  to	  confront	  labor	  militancy	  and	  conduct	  collective	  bargaining.	  We	  see	  that	  besides	  the	  political	  factors,	  the	  organizational	  strength	  of	  labor	  accounts	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  organizational	  strength	  and	  structure	  of	  business	  interest	  organization.	  	  
III.	  Other	  Stimulating	  or	  Inhibiting	  Factors	  in	  the	  Creation	  of	  Business	  
Associations	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  Olson	  suggests,	  all	  groups	  organize	  to	  further	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  members	  and	  the	  collective	  good	  were	  the	  determinants	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  business	  associations.	  Yet	  there	  are	  factors	  that	  facilitate	  or	  inhibit	  the	  condition	  and	  possibility	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  business	  association.	  These	  factors	  act	  as	  catalysts,	  or	  conversely	  inhibitors,	  but	  not	  determinants	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  singular	  peak	  business	  associations.	  For	  example,	  Manow	  and	  Van	  Kersbergen	  suggests	  that	  the	  religious	  differences	  among	  catholic	  and	  protestant	  populations	  in	  certain	  European	  states	  undermined	  collective	  actions	  and	  the	  efforts	  to	  create	  a	  united	  peak	  business	  association	  (Manow	  and	  van	  Kersbergen	  2009).	  King	  suggests	  that	  ethnic	  cleavages	  in	  the	  United	  States	  debilitated	  efforts	  of	  collective	  actions	  (King	  2005).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Besides	  social	  cleavages,	  Tolliday	  and	  Zeitlin	  suggest	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  regional	  diversity	  in	  national	  economies	  could	  influence	  the	  organization	  of	  business	  associations.	  High	  level	  of	  economic	  diversity	  complicates	  organization,	  since	  there	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is	  less	  common	  ground	  for	  businesses	  of	  different	  sectors.	  So	  economic	  diversity	  in	  the	  national	  political	  economy	  serves	  as	  an	  inhibitor	  for	  centralized	  peak	  business	  associations	  (Tolliday	  and	  Zeitlin	  1991).	  Similarly,	  polities	  with	  central	  unitary	  systems	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  all-­‐encompassing	  business	  associations,	  since	  economic	  activities	  and	  policymaking	  tends	  to	  be	  more	  centralized	  in	  these	  polities,	  while	  polities	  with	  federalism	  and	  strong	  regional	  authority	  are	  more	  unlikely	  to	  have	  all-­‐encompassing	  business	  associations	  since	  business	  activities	  are	  more	  decentralized	  and	  national	  coordinative	  efforts	  were	  more	  difficult	  (Martin	  and	  Swank	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  factors	  that	  stimulate	  the	  formation	  of	  centralized	  business	  associations.	  Historical	  institutionalists	  like	  Thelen	  suggest	  that	  existing	  pre-­‐industrial	  institutions	  that	  facilitate	  cooperation	  could	  enhance	  the	  chance	  of	  industrial	  coordination.	  For	  instance,	  institutions	  like	  guilds	  and	  rural	  cooperatives	  facilitate	  the	  sectorial	  coordination,	  since	  the	  conflict	  between	  employers	  and	  employees	  were	  not	  distinct	  (Thelen	  2004).	  Besides,	  the	  existence	  of	  industrial-­‐based	  unions	  also	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  consensus-­‐based	  business	  associations,	  since	  industrial	  unions	  create	  the	  capacity	  and	  interest	  to	  cooperate	  with	  employers	  in	  training	  and	  wages	  (Thelen	  2004;	  Swenson	  2002).	  	  	  	  	  	  To	  sum	  up,	  there	  are	  two	  strands	  of	  thoughts	  regarding	  the	  origins	  of	  business	  associations.	  The	  first	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  cost	  and	  benefits	  of	  collective	  actions.	  Common	  goods	  like	  standardization,	  skill	  formation,	  exchange	  of	  market	  information	  and	  technology,	  consensual	  labor	  relations,	  and	  managed	  competitions	  are	  all	  important	  incentives	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  encompassing	  peak	  business	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association,	  while	  the	  cost	  of	  monitoring,	  communication,	  rule-­‐enforcement	  creates	  cost	  for	  collective	  actions.	  Political	  scientists	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  third	  party,	  mainly	  political	  actors,	  in	  the	  organization	  efforts	  of	  the	  business	  sector.	  The	  state,	  political	  parties,	  and	  labor,	  they	  argue,	  all	  play	  important	  roles	  in	  mobilizing	  business	  interest	  and	  organizing	  central	  business	  associations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  following	  case	  studies,	  we	  will	  examine	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  business	  associations	  of	  the	  two	  newly-­‐industrializing	  countries,	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan.	  We	  will	  trace	  the	  pattern	  and	  trends	  of	  its	  development	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  examine	  the	  possible	  factors	  of	  difference	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  We	  will	  emphasize	  on	  the	  efforts	  to	  organize	  for	  economic	  benefits,	  collective	  actions	  against	  labor	  movement,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  party	  politics	  and	  democratization	  on	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  organization	  of	  business	  associations.	  	  	  
Case	  1:	  Taiwan	  	  
Taiwan	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  Business	  Associations	  	  	  	  	  The	  following	  case	  study	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  initial	  conditions	  of	  business	  interest	  associations	  in	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  Taiwan,	  in	  particular,	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  the	  state	  corporatist	  structure	  in	  Taiwan	  under	  the	  KMT	  regime	  and	  how	  the	  state-­‐led	  economic	  development	  affected	  the	  institutional	  patterns	  of	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  Taiwan.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  quasi-­‐Leninist	  KMT	  party-­‐state	  had	  deep	  penetration	  and	  control	  over	  the	  business	  organizations	  and	  labor	  unions,	  from	  the	  top	  peak	  associations	  to	  the	  enterprise	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levels	  below.	  The	  corporatist	  structure	  of	  business	  associations	  and	  labor	  unions	  enhanced	  political	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  KMT	  regime	  but	  served	  little	  economic	  functions.	  Economic	  coordination	  took	  place	  mainly	  in	  the	  sectorial	  associations	  like	  the	  Taiwan Electrical Appliances Manufacturer Association (TEAMA) and Taiwan 
Footwear Manufacturers’ Association (TFMA) (Doner and Schneider 2000; Noble 1998).  
    I suggest that in the party-state authoritarian regime there was a division of labor 
between state-owned enterprises and large enterprises-dominated upstream industries on 
the one hand, and small-and-medium-sized downstream enterprises on the other hand. 
State-owned enterprises are largely managed and controlled by Mainlanders	  while	  the	  SMEs	  are	  owned	  by	  the	  local	  Taiwanese	  businessmen.	  Such economic division of 
labor exacerbated the ethnic division, making the formation of the united peak business 
association more difficult.   	  	  	  	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  case	  study,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  transformation	  of	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  Taiwan	  under	  economic	  liberalization	  and	  democratization.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  study,	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  state,	  party,	  business,	  and	  labor	  actors	  react	  to	  these	  changes,	  and	  how	  these	  interactions	  shape	  the	  structure	  and	  organization	  of	  business	  association.	  I	  argue	  that	  political	  liberalization	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  opposition	  party	  intensified	  electoral	  competition,	  incentivizing	  the	  ruling	  KMT	  to	  distribute	  particularistic	  economic	  benefits	  in	  exchange	  for	  political	  loyalty	  and	  support.	  Such	  political	  exchange	  further	  undermined	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  encompassing	  business	  association.	  Also,	  party	  politics	  and	  the	  political	  division	  on	  issues	  like	  Taiwanese	  self-­‐reliance	  and	  Taiwan-­‐Mainland	  relations	  created	  new	  division	  in	  the	  society	  and	  within	  the	  business	  class.	  With	  the	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emerging	  political	  bipolarity,	  the	  KMT	  and	  the	  DPP	  both	  courted	  and	  established	  their	  party-­‐affiliated	  business	  associations.	  Party	  politics	  created	  a	  divisive	  force	  in	  the	  business	  class	  in	  Taiwan.	  	  	  	  	  	  Lastly,	  I	  argue	  that	  unlike	  the	  case	  in	  South	  Korea,	  the	  labor	  militancy	  in	  Taiwan	  was	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  pressure	  the	  employers	  to	  organize	  and	  form	  a	  centralized	  employers	  association	  to	  battle	  against	  labor	  activism.	  Labor	  activists	  focused	  more	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  independent	  unions	  than	  on	  nationalized	  collective	  bargaining.	  Thus	  we	  do	  not	  see	  a	  labor	  as	  a	  negative	  incentive	  for	  employer	  solidarity.	  	  	  
State	  corporatism	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  quasi-­‐Leninist	  KMT	  Party	  state	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  KMT	  central	  government	  landed	  Taiwan	  and	  treated	  Taiwan	  as	  a	  military	  base	  to	  fight	  back	  and	  retake	  Mainland	  China.	  Taiwan,	  unlike	  other	  parts	  of	  Mainland	  China,	  was	  under	  Japanese	  colonial	  rule	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  After	  the	  Japanese	  surrendered,	  the	  KMT-­‐led	  Republic	  of	  China	  took	  over	  the	  island	  in	  1945,	  and	  three	  years	  later,	  the	  KMT	  central	  government	  from	  the	  Mainland	  retreated	  to	  Taiwan	  after	  its	  defeat	  by	  the	  communists.	  Martial	  law	  was	  imposed	  upon	  the	  Taiwanese	  people.	  The	  retake	  over	  the	  Mainland	  was	  not	  successful	  till	  the	  present	  day,	  and	  Taiwan	  was	  ruled	  under	  authoritarian	  granted	  by	  the	  martial	  law	  from	  1949	  to	  1988,	  and	  the	  polity	  was	  controlled	  by	  the	  KMT	  party	  until	  2000,	  when	  the	  DPP	  opposition	  took	  power	  (Roy	  2002;	  Cheng	  1993).	  	  	  	  	  	  After	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  in	  1949,	  the	  central	  government	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	  retreated	  to	  Taiwan,	  and	  the	  ruling	  party,	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  or	  KMT	  brought	  the	  national	  bureaucracy	  and	  military	  with	  them	  (Cheng	  1989;	  Cheng	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1993).	  The	  KMT	  also	  brought	  the	  system	  of	  social	  control	  and	  mobilization	  was	  brought	  from	  the	  Mainland	  to	  Taiwan.	  As	  Cheng	  suggests,	  the	  KMT	  was	  a	  quasi-­‐Leninist	  party	  and	  the	  party	  was	  hierarchically	  structured,	  and	  its	  branches	  scattered	  all	  parts	  of	  society	  (Cheng	  1989).	  Under	  such	  political	  system,	  all	  social	  groups	  had	  to	  be	  registered	  under	  the	  party,	  and	  social	  organizations	  were	  overseen	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  of	  the	  KMT	  party	  and	  monitored	  by	  the	  intelligence	  agencies	  (Cheng	  1989).	  Civil	  society	  was	  organized	  under	  the	  state	  corporatist	  structure,	  where	  organizations	  were	  singular,	  non-­‐competitive,	  hierarchically	  ordered,	  and	  monitored	  and	  manipulated	  by	  the	  state	  (Cheng	  1989;	  McBeath	  1998).	  	  	  	  	  	  Businesses,	  the	  subject	  of	  our	  concern,	  were	  also	  incorporated	  in	  the	  state	  corporatist	  structure.	  All	  Taiwanese	  businesses	  were	  required	  to	  join	  one	  of	  the	  two	  peak	  associations:	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  Commerce	  (NFC)	  or	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  Industries	  (NFI).	  The	  National	  Federation	  of	  Industries	  dated	  back	  in	  1942,	  formed	  by	  industrialists	  in	  the	  Mainland.	  Similarly,	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  Commerce	  was	  a	  legacy	  of	  the	  KMT	  regime	  in	  the	  Mainland.	  The	  National	  Federation	  of	  Commerce	  was	  founded	  in	  1946	  and	  was	  moved	  to	  Taiwan	  soon	  after	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  KMT.	  The	  NFI	  consisted	  of	  mainly	  industrialists	  and	  manufacturers,	  while	  the	  NFC	  consisted	  of	  mainly	  traders	  and	  merchants.	  Later,	  it	  also	  included	  businessmen	  from	  the	  service	  sector.	  Like	  all	  other	  social	  organizations,	  the	  KMT	  Department	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  oversaw	  and	  monitored	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  business	  associations.	  The	  party	  not	  only	  monitored	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  business	  associations,	  it	  also	  controlled	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  business	  interest	  organizations.	  The	  chairperson	  of	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the	  peak	  associations	  were	  always	  handpicked	  by	  the	  supreme	  leader	  of	  the	  KMT	  and	  were	  always	  in	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  KMT	  (McBeath	  1998;	  Fields	  1997).	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  Leninist	  party-­‐state	  covered	  all	  levels	  of	  society,	  including	  labor.	  The	  KMT-­‐sponsored	  China	  Federation	  of	  Labor	  (CFL)	  was	  the	  only	  authorized	  peak	  labor	  unions	  in	  Taiwan.	  The	  president	  of	  the	  CFL,	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  NFL	  and	  NFC,	  was	  always	  handpicked	  by	  the	  party	  leadership	  and	  was	  usually	  part	  of	  the	  party	  central	  committee	  (Ho	  2006).	  Below	  the	  national	  level,	  there	  were	  the	  regional	  level	  unions,	  for	  example,	  the	  Kaosiung	  Regional	  Union.	  Regional	  unions	  had	  little	  representational	  power	  and	  influence	  over	  the	  labor	  policies,	  but	  they	  were	  obliged	  to	  pay	  dues	  to	  the	  central	  peak	  association.	  Below	  the	  regional	  unions,	  there	  were	  the	  industrial	  unions	  and	  occupational	  unions.	  Industrial	  unions	  were	  unions	  of	  the	  entire	  industry,	  however	  ironically,	  collective	  actions	  and	  wage	  bargaining	  were	  allowed	  to	  take	  place	  only	  in	  the	  enterprise	  level.	  Besides,	  only	  SOEs	  and	  selective	  unions	  were	  allowed	  to	  form	  industrial	  unions,	  while	  unions	  in	  the	  private	  sectors	  were	  mostly	  occupational	  unions	  (Ho	  2006;	  Hsiao	  1992).	  Union	  leadership	  of	  all	  levels	  was	  selected	  by	  the	  KMT	  Department	  of	  Social	  Affairs.	  In	  general,	  the	  unions	  enjoyed	  very	  little	  autonomy	  and	  representation.	  	  	  
State-­‐led	  industrialization	  and	  the	  divide	  between	  large	  enterprises	  and	  SMEs	  	  	  	  	  The	  KMT	  state	  initiated	  the	  industrialization	  project	  soon	  after	  it	  consolidated	  power	  on	  the	  island.	  In	  the	  1950s,	  the	  KMT	  regime	  adopted	  the	  import-­‐substitution	  strategy	  of	  industrialization.	  Extensive	  quantitative	  restrictions	  on	  imports	  and	  high	  tariffs	  were	  enforced	  to	  cultivated	  domestic	  industries	  and	  manufacturing.	  Using	  US	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technology	  and	  financial	  aid,	  the	  Mainlander	  capitalist	  who	  followed	  Chiang	  to	  Taiwan	  started	  textile	  factories	  on	  the	  island.	  The	  regime	  was	  also	  active	  in	  grooming	  industries	  like	  plastics,	  artificial	  fibers,	  cement,	  glass,	  fertilizers,	  and	  plywood	  (Wade	  1990).	  Besides	  benefiting	  the	  well-­‐connected	  Mainlanders,	  the	  regime	  created	  economic	  opportunities	  to	  co-­‐opt	  local	  capitalists.	  For	  example,	  the	  regime	  invited	  Wang	  Yongqing,	  one	  of	  the	  notables	  in	  Taipei	  and	  Koo	  Zhenfu	  to	  develop	  the	  cement	  industry.	  (Wade	  1990)	  For	  industries	  that	  were	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  military,	  the	  regime	  chose	  to	  establish	  them	  through	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises,	  for	  example	  China	  Steel,	  China	  Shipyard,	  and	  China	  Petrochemical	  (Chang	  2008;	  Huang	  2004).	  In	  the	  import-­‐substitution	  era,	  the	  KMT	  regime	  developed	  numerous	  upstream	  industries	  through	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  and	  well-­‐collected	  Taiwanese-­‐owned	  large-­‐enterprises.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  1970s,	  the	  international	  economic	  crises	  forced	  Taiwan	  to	  upgrade	  its	  economy.	  In	  response	  to	  intense	  competition	  with	  other	  Asian	  Tigers,	  European	  and	  American	  protectionism,	  and	  the	  skyrocketing	  energy	  prices,	  Taiwan	  shifted	  its	  industrial	  focus	  on	  non	  energy-­‐intensive,	  capital	  and	  technological-­‐intensive	  industries	  like	  semiconductors,	  computers,	  telecommunications,	  and	  machine	  tools,	  robotics,	  and	  biotechnology.	  It	  was	  precisely	  at	  this	  time	  when	  local	  democratic	  movement	  stated	  to	  grow.	  The	  state	  chose	  to	  develop	  these	  industries	  with	  local	  SMEs	  because	  the	  regime	  wanted	  to	  keep	  the	  local	  capitalists	  from	  expanding	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  co-­‐opt	  capitalists	  for	  political	  stability	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  The	  state	  facilitated	  the	  development	  of	  these	  industries	  by	  establishing	  state-­‐sponsored	  research	  labs	  and	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  higher	  education	  (Wade	  1990;	  Wu	  2004).	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  Throughout	  the	  process	  of	  rapid	  economic	  development	  under	  the	  KMT	  authoritarian	  party	  regime,	  we	  see	  there	  was	  a	  division	  of	  labor	  between	  enterprises	  of	  different	  origins	  and	  different	  forms	  of	  ownership	  was	  developed.	  At	  the	  top	  there	  were	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  They	  occupy	  the	  heavy	  industry	  sectors,	  as	  well	  as	  finance	  and	  other	  service	  sector	  (Huang	  2004;	  Chang	  2008).	  The	  second	  level	  is	  the	  large	  enterprises.	  It	  consists	  of	  the	  well-­‐connected	  capitalists	  and	  dominated	  the	  non-­‐military	  upstream	  industries	  and	  domestic	  consumption	  market	  (Huang	  2004).	  At	  the	  bottom,	  there	  were	  the	  small-­‐and-­‐medium	  sized	  enterprises.	  Unlike	  Korea,	  it	  was	  the	  SMEs	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  export	  (Huang	  2004;	  Wu	  2004).	  	  	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  SMEs	  were	  the	  major	  contributors	  of	  the	  export-­‐led	  industrialization	  in	  Taiwan,	  they	  did	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  state-­‐controlled	  financial	  system.	  Like	  South	  Korea,	  the	  banking	  system	  was	  nationalized	  before	  the	  export-­‐led	  industrialization	  took	  off.	  The	  KMT	  regime	  took	  over	  the	  Japanese-­‐owned	  banks	  in	  the	  colonial	  period	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  brought	  in	  the	  state-­‐owned	  commercial	  banks	  from	  Mainland	  China	  to	  Taiwan	  after	  the	  KMT’s	  defeat	  in	  the	  Mainland.	  Yet	  as	  scholars	  suggest,	  the	  KMT	  regime	  intentionally	  held	  credit	  from	  the	  local	  Taiwanese	  capitalists	  because	  the	  Mainlander-­‐dominated	  regime	  highly	  distrusted	  the	  local	  capitalists,	  fearing	  that	  the	  empowerment	  of	  the	  local	  elites	  would	  endanger	  the	  minority	  government	  on	  the	  island	  (Cheng	  1993).	  Besides,	  banking	  procedures	  and	  rules	  for	  the	  state-­‐controlled	  banks	  were	  very	  strict	  and	  conservative	  because	  senior	  party	  leaders	  and	  state	  officials	  put	  macro-­‐economic	  stability	  as	  the	  top	  priority	  after	  the	  bitter	  memory	  of	  hyperinflation	  in	  the	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Mainland.	  Bank	  employees	  were	  held	  personally	  responsible	  for	  the	  bad	  loans,	  making	  bankers	  extremely	  risk-­‐averse	  and	  cautious,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  SME	  were	  discriminated	  against	  (Fields	  1995).	  Regardless	  of	  their	  contribution	  to	  the	  export-­‐led	  growth,	  the	  Taiwanese	  owned	  SMEs	  were	  chronically	  short	  of	  capital	  (Fields	  1995).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  SOEs	  and	  the	  large	  enterprises	  had	  a	  totally	  different	  status	  in	  the	  economy.	  Because	  of	  their	  connections	  in	  the	  government,	  they	  were	  well-­‐funded	  and	  could	  have	  better	  deals	  in	  the	  state-­‐controlled	  banking	  system	  (Cheng	  1993).	  Besides,	  because	  of	  their	  size,	  they	  had	  alterative	  methods	  of	  corporate	  finance,	  such	  the	  stock	  and	  bond	  market	  (Fields	  1995).	  We	  see	  that	  the	  SOEs	  and	  the	  large	  enterprises	  had	  greater	  economic	  advantage	  compared	  to	  the	  SMEs.	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  see	  that	  there	  was	  a	  great	  chasm	  between	  the	  SOEs	  and	  LEs	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  SMEs	  on	  the	  other.	  First,	  the	  two	  groups	  were	  divided	  based	  on	  ethnic	  lines.	  The	  SOEs	  and	  many	  of	  the	  large	  enterprises	  were	  managed	  or	  owned	  by	  the	  Mainlanders	  and	  KMT-­‐loyal	  local	  elites.	  They	  had	  little	  kinship	  network	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  Taiwanese,	  and	  thus	  there	  were	  little	  interaction	  other	  than	  necessary	  business	  transaction	  (Huang	  2004;	  Wang	  2004).	  Second,	  the	  two	  groups	  were	  divided	  based	  on	  economic	  status	  and	  interest.	  The	  SMEs	  were	  mainly	  exporters	  competed	  in	  the	  international	  market.	  They	  were	  the	  price	  takers	  and	  had	  little	  voice	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  SOEs	  and	  the	  LEs	  were	  oligarchies	  or	  even	  monopolies	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  They	  enjoyed	  great	  economic	  privileges	  and	  had	  greater	  voice	  in	  the	  market	  (Huang	  2004;	  Wang	  2004;	  Fields	  1995).	  With	  different	  market	  conditions,	  there	  was	  little	  common	  interest	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between	  the	  two	  groups.	  The	  divide	  base	  on	  ethnicity	  and	  economic	  status	  made	  the	  nation-­‐wide	  coordination	  difficult	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  	  	  	  Therefore,	  even	  though	  all	  enterprises	  were	  nominally	  registered	  under	  the	  state-­‐corporatist	  structure	  of	  interest	  representation,	  in	  reality	  they	  were	  little	  coordination	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  Although	  business	  from	  all	  levels	  were	  included	  in	  either	  of	  the	  national	  peak	  associations,	  the	  two	  peak	  associations	  served	  little	  economic	  functions,	  partly	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  autonomy.	  On	  the	  top	  level,	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  were	  managed	  directly	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Economic	  Affairs.	  On	  the	  second	  level,	  the	  large	  enterprises	  all	  joined	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Commerce	  and	  Industries.	  The	  organization	  was	  established	  in	  1951,	  facilitated	  by	  the	  state.	  The	  NCIC	  consisted	  of	  the	  largest	  business	  groups	  of	  the	  nation.	  The	  NCIC	  created	  a	  platform	  for	  the	  big	  industrialist	  to	  have	  access	  with	  the	  public	  officials,	  including	  the	  top	  bureaucrats	  in	  the	  powerful	  Council	  for	  Economic	  Planning	  and	  Development.	  The	  NCIC	  also	  held	  regular	  breakfast	  meetings	  with	  the	  economic	  bureaucrats	  (Fields	  1997).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  At	  the	  lower	  level,	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Small-­‐and-­‐Medium	  Sized	  Enterprises	  (NASME)	  created	  in	  1972,	  was	  inefficient	  until	  2000.	  Because	  of	  geographical	  and	  numerical	  difficulties,	  there	  was	  little	  cross-­‐sectorial	  coordination	  among	  the	  SMEs.	  Because	  of	  the	  Mainlander-­‐Taiwanese	  differences,	  there	  were	  little	  non-­‐market	  coordination	  between	  the	  SMEs	  and	  the	  large-­‐enterprises,	  or	  between	  the	  SMEs	  and	  the	  SOEs.	  Coordination	  took	  place	  largely	  in	  the	  sectorial	  level.	  For	  example,	  Taiwan Electrical Appliances Manufacturer Association (TEAMA) 
successfully pressed for a coordinated tariff policy that protected its members 
Aaron	  Tsang	  Political	  Science	  Undergraduate	  Honor	  Thesis	  	  
	  
29	  
while keeping them on their toes (Doner and Schneider 2000).	  Among	  the	  SMEs,	  there	  were	  strong	  sectorial	  associations,	  for	  example	  as	  mentioned,	  the	  Taiwan Electrical 
Appliances Manufacturer Association (TEAMA) and Taiwan Footwear Manufacturers’ 
Association (TFMA) (Doner	  and	  Schneider	  2000;	  Wade	  1990).	   	  	  	  	  Unlike	  the	  conglomerate	  business	  groups	  in	  South	  Korea,	  there	  were	  a	  division	  of	  labor	  between	  the	  upstream	  SOE	  and	  LEs	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  SMEs	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  Because	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  kinship	  network	  and	  lack	  of	  common	  economic	  interests,	  there	  were	  little	  interactions	  and	  coordination	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  enterprises.	  The	  divide	  in	  business	  made	  the	  nation-­‐scale	  coordination	  difficult	  even	  after	  the	  fading	  of	  the	  developmental	  state	  and	  the	  retreat	  of	  social	  control	  by	  the	  KMT	  ruling	  party.	  	  	  
Changes	  in	  the	  1980s:	  Facing	  the	  Currents	  of	  Democratization	  and	  Economic	  
Liberalization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  KMT	  party	  and	  much	  of	  its	  state-­‐corporatist	  has	  remained	  up	  to	  this	  date,	  the	  power	  relations	  between	  the	  party-­‐state	  and	  society	  has	  changed	  drastically	  since	  the	  1980s.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  there	  were	  four	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  environment	  that	  might	  create	  conditions	  for	  changes	  in	  the	  business-­‐state	  relations	  and	  the	  patterns	  of	  business	  coordination	  in	  Taiwan.	  	  First,	  a	  local	  democratic	  movement	  started	  in	  the	  1970s,	  followed	  by	  the	  diplomatic	  crisis	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	  regime	  was	  emerged.	  Students	  and	  the	  middle	  class	  formed	  the	  Dangwai,	  or	  outside	  the	  party	  and	  call	  for	  free	  elections	  and	  the	  self-­‐determination	  of	  the	  Taiwanese	  people	  (Roy	  2003).	  Gradually,	  in	  1987,	  martial	  laws	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were	  lifted	  and	  free	  elections	  at	  the	  Legislative	  Yuan	  took	  place	  in	  1991,	  and	  free	  presidential	  election	  took	  place	  in	  1996	  (Roy	  2003).	  The	  opposition	  party,	  the	  Democratic	  Progressive	  Party,	  was	  formed	  in	  1985,	  and	  started	  to	  compete	  with	  KMT	  for	  electoral	  support	  in	  local	  and	  national	  elections.	  KMT	  was	  gradually	  transformed	  from	  a	  quasi-­‐Leninist	  party	  to	  a	  democratic	  competitive	  party.	  The	  control	  of	  the	  party-­‐state	  over	  social	  organizations	  was	  weakened	  after	  the	  martial	  law	  has	  been	  lifted	  and	  the	  party	  gradually	  retreated	  from	  the	  state	  corporatist	  structure	  (McBeath	  1998;	  Cheng	  1989).	  The	  Department	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  of	  the	  KMT	  no	  longer	  selected	  the	  leadership	  nor	  monitored	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  business	  associations	  (McBeath	  1998).	  With	  such	  changes,	  we	  would	  expect	  that	  with	  the	  retreat	  of	  the	  party	  from	  civil	  society,	  business	  actors	  would	  take	  over	  the	  existing	  corporatist	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  system	  would	  gradually	  transform	  itself	  into	  a	  societal	  corporatist	  structure.	  	  	  	  	  	  Second,	  we	  see	  the	  boundary	  between	  the	  Mainlanders	  and	  the	  local	  Taiwanese	  have	  faded	  in	  the	  course	  of	  economic	  development.	  (Johnson	  1992)	  The	  traditional	  boundary	  between	  the	  Mainlander	  political	  elites	  and	  well	  connected	  and	  the	  local	  Taiwanese	  businessmen	  had	  been	  fading.	  Since	  the	  1980s,	  local	  Taiwanese	  business	  groups	  grew.	  Many	  became	  as	  powerful	  as	  their	  Mainlander	  counterparts.	  Besides,	  intermarriage	  between	  Mainlanders	  and	  Taiwanese	  became	  more	  common,	  according	  to	  Johnson	  (Johnson	  1992).	  The	  gap	  between	  Mainlander	  and	  Taiwanese	  has	  narrowed.	  We	  would	  expect	  the	  closing	  of	  the	  ethnic	  gap	  would	  facilitate	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  state-­‐corporatist	  system	  to	  a	  societal	  corporatist	  system.	  	  
Aaron	  Tsang	  Political	  Science	  Undergraduate	  Honor	  Thesis	  	  
	  
31	  
	  	  	  	  Third,	  the	  financial	  market	  in	  Taiwan	  was	  opened	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  Regulations	  over	  capital,	  interest	  rates,	  and	  exchange	  rates	  have	  largely	  been	  released.	  Foreign	  banks	  and	  private	  domestic	  banks	  were	  allowed	  to	  enter	  the	  Taiwanese	  domestic	  market	  and	  compete	  with	  state-­‐controlled	  commercial	  banks	  (Chang	  2008).	  Besides,	  the	  state-­‐owned	  banks	  were	  gradually	  privatized.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  no	  longer	  had	  direct	  control	  over	  the	  financial	  institutions,	  and	  thus	  the	  Taiwanese	  businesses	  were	  no	  longer	  financially	  dependent	  on	  the	  state	  (Chang	  2008).	  With	  the	  economic	  liberalization,	  we	  would	  expect	  the	  greater	  financial	  autonomy	  would	  also	  facilitate	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  autonomous	  business	  associations.	  	  	  	  	  	  Fourth,	  following	  the	  current	  of	  democratization	  and	  the	  lift	  of	  the	  martial	  law,	  there	  was	  an	  outburst	  of	  labor	  movement	  in	  Taiwan.	  According	  to	  Hsiao,	  strikes,	  labor	  disputes,	  and	  creation	  of	  independent	  unions	  rose	  rapidly	  (Hsiao	  1992;	  Ho	  2006).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  manipulation	  of	  the	  KMT	  party	  over	  labor	  has	  diminished.	  We	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  business,	  because	  of	  such	  changing	  labor	  relations,	  would	  organize	  themselves	  to	  seek	  collective	  actions	  in	  response	  to	  changing	  industrial	  relations.	  	  	  	  	  	  Given	  these	  changing	  conditions,	  we	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  Taiwanese	  businesses	  would	  retain	  the	  corporatist	  structure	  and	  gradually	  transform	  into	  a	  societal	  corporatist	  structure.	  We	  would	  expect	  that	  there	  would	  be	  an	  institutional	  continuity	  and	  the	  changes	  in	  political	  and	  economic	  environment	  would	  favor	  the	  transition	  from	  state	  corporatism	  to	  societal	  corporatism.	  However,	  such	  transformation	  did	  not	  happen	  as	  expected.	  Instead,	  the	  structure	  of	  business	  organization	  has	  gradually	  become	  pluralist	  and	  competitive.	  The	  institution	  of	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collective	  wage	  bargaining	  did	  not	  evolve.	  The	  corporatist	  state-­‐labor-­‐business	  tripartite	  commission	  was	  not	  institutionalized.	  The	  initial	  state	  corporatist	  structure	  in	  the	  authoritarian	  era	  was	  not	  translated	  into	  a	  societal	  corporatist	  structure	  but	  was	  degenerated	  into	  a	  mere	  pluralist	  system.	  	  	  	  	  The	  question	  then	  is	  why	  did	  Taiwan	  move	  to	  a	  pluralist	  path,	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  corporatist	  organizational	  framework?	  Why	  didn’t	  we	  see	  a	  transition	  from	  state	  corporatism	  to	  societal	  corporatism	  like	  what	  we	  see	  in	  Germany	  and	  Japan?	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  three	  factors	  that	  lead	  Taiwan	  to	  a	  pluralist	  path.	  First,	  because	  of	  party	  politics,	  the	  state	  failed	  to	  provide	  selective	  benefits	  for	  the	  business	  to	  retain	  in	  a	  consolidated	  organization.	  Instead	  of	  providing	  selective	  benefits	  to	  keep	  businesses	  in	  an	  encompassing	  peak	  association,	  politicians	  courted	  individual	  business	  groups	  and	  thus	  lowered	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  collective	  lobbying	  and	  bargaining	  in	  the	  business	  association.	  	  Second,	  because	  of	  party	  politics,	  there	  was	  a	  tendency	  for	  each	  political	  party	  to	  create	  their	  own	  party-­‐affiliated	  peak	  business	  association,	  thus	  further	  splitted	  the	  business	  community.	  Third,	  the	  disorganized	  labor	  movement	  did	  not	  create	  a	  pressure	  for	  the	  Taiwanese	  businesses	  to	  organize	  and	  unite	  for	  collective	  measures	  against	  labor	  militancy.	  With	  these	  reasons,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Taiwanese	  business	  interest	  representational	  system	  did	  not	  smoothly	  undergo	  a	  transition	  from	  a	  state-­‐corporatist	  system	  to	  a	  corporatist	  system	  like	  that	  in	  Japan	  and	  Germany.	  	  	  
Democratization	  and	  the	  realignment	  of	  state-­‐business	  relations	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  When	  the	  martial	  law	  was	  still	  in	  effect,	  national	  elections	  were	  not	  opened	  to	  the	  Taiwanese.	  The	  KMT	  government	  identified	  itself	  as	  the	  government	  of	  the	  Chinese	  nation,	  and	  thus	  the	  Legislative	  Yuan	  should	  consist	  of	  representatives	  of	  the	  entire	  nation.	  Thus,	  the	  elderly	  representatives	  whom	  the	  KMT	  émigré	  government	  brought	  with	  them	  served	  until	  the	  1989.	  Between	  1949	  and	  1989,	  there	  were	  no	  national	  elections	  for	  the	  legislative	  branch	  (Roy	  2003;	  Huang	  2004;	  Hood	  1997).	  Similarly,	  under	  the	  martial	  law,	  the	  president	  could	  remain	  in	  power	  until	  the	  “emergency”	  was	  over.	  Thus,	  the	  presidency	  was	  never	  opened	  to	  public	  election	  throughout	  the	  authoritarian	  regime1.	  Elections	  were	  restricted	  to	  the	  local	  level.	  The	  KMT	  regime	  allowed	  local	  elections	  because	  the	  party	  treated	  local	  elections	  as	  a	  means	  to	  contain	  and	  co-­‐opt	  the	  local	  elites,	  where	  they	  cultivated	  at	  least	  two	  factions	  in	  the	  locality,	  and	  constantly	  balance	  the	  power	  between	  the	  factions	  (Cheng	  and	  Chang	  2001;	  Hood	  1997).	  The	  local	  branch	  of	  the	  party	  recruited	  members	  from	  all	  factions,	  and	  balanced	  the	  power	  and	  influence	  through	  patronage	  (Cheng	  and	  Chang	  2001).	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  political	  situation	  had	  changed	  soon	  after	  the	  opposition	  party	  was	  created	  and	  national	  elections	  were	  opened	  to	  competition.	  The	  KMT	  by	  then	  had	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  DPP	  for	  the	  support	  of	  local	  Taiwanese	  voters,	  consisted	  of	  85%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  in	  1989.	  The	  DPP	  opposition	  adopted	  a	  strategy	  of	  invoking	  the	  Taiwanese	  identity	  and	  preaching	  liberal	  political	  ideology,	  which	  proved	  to	  be	  extremely	  effective	  in	  local	  elections	  (Cheng	  1989;	  Cheng	  2001).	  With	  intensified	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Unlike	  South	  Korea,	  where	  there	  was	  rigged	  elections	  throughout	  the	  military	  dictatorship	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electoral	  competition,	  the	  KMT	  courted	  the	  local	  business	  groups	  with	  greater	  economic	  rent	  and	  benefits	  in	  exchange	  for	  political	  support	  and	  loyalty.	  The	  KMT	  encouraged	  local	  business	  groups	  to	  join	  the	  KMT	  party	  and	  run	  for	  local	  offices	  or	  for	  legislators	  in	  the	  Legislative	  Branch.	  According	  to	  Huang,	  in	  the	  1992	  legislative	  election,	  there	  was	  47.20	  %	  of	  the	  legislator	  who	  had	  family	  connections	  with	  business	  groups.	  (Cheng	  and	  Chang	  2001;	  Huang	  2004)	  Democratization	  altered	  the	  power	  structure	  in	  Taiwanese	  politics,	  making	  state-­‐business	  collusion	  in	  its	  historical	  height.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Initially,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  few	  well-­‐connected	  business	  families,	  most	  Taiwanese	  businesses	  were	  underrepresented	  in	  the	  political	  and	  policy	  realm.	  The	  KMT	  Mainlander	  regime,	  as	  Cheng	  suggests,	  was	  suspicious	  about	  the	  local	  Taiwanese	  capitalists.	  The	  regime	  deliberately	  distanced	  itself	  from	  the	  majority	  of	  Taiwanese	  businesses	  (Cheng	  1993).	  However,	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  elections	  also	  opened	  a	  path	  for	  individualistic	  bargaining	  and	  thus	  undermined	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  consolidated	  business	  association	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  	  	  
The	  Politics	  of	  Economic	  Liberation	  and	  Privatization	  of	  State-­‐owned	  Enterprises	  In	  
Taiwan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  DPP	  opposition	  not	  only	  created	  greater	  electoral	  competition	  in	  the	  political	  system,	  it	  also	  created	  a	  consistent	  force	  to	  challenge	  the	  economic	  oligarchy	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  Following	  the	  increasingly	  popular	  neoliberal	  economic	  thoughts,	  DPP	  politicians	  advocated	  a	  liberalization	  of	  the	  domestic	  market	  and	  the	  privatization	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (Wang	  2004;	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Roy	  2003).	  The	  regime	  was	  also	  pressed	  by	  foreign	  competitors	  to	  open	  up	  the	  domestic	  market,	  especially	  in	  financial	  service.	  Under	  such	  pressure,	  the	  KMT	  gradually	  and	  limited	  opened	  the	  domestic	  market	  and	  privatized	  parts	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (Chang	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	  there	  were	  political	  calculations	  behind	  the	  privatization	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  Democratization	  created	  a	  double	  challenge	  to	  the	  KMT.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  intensified	  elections	  demanded	  greater	  financial	  resources	  for	  campaigns	  or	  even	  bribing,	  yet	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  democratization	  increased	  the	  transparency	  of	  political	  procedures,	  making	  the	  transfer	  of	  funds	  from	  the	  government	  to	  the	  party	  apparatus	  increasingly	  difficult.	  The	  separation	  of	  state	  and	  party	  created	  great	  financial	  challenges	  to	  the	  KMT	  regime	  under	  Lee.	  The	  KMT	  could	  follow	  its	  Japanese	  contemporaries	  by	  supporting	  electoral	  campaigns	  through	  political	  donations.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  donations	  that	  KMT	  politicians	  receive	  from	  the	  private	  sector,	  senior	  party	  leaders	  were	  resistant	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  total	  dependence	  on	  the	  business	  sector.	  Under	  such	  conditions,	  the	  KMT	  regime	  used	  the	  privatization	  of	  SOEs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  support	  electoral	  competition	  in	  the	  local	  and	  national	  electoral	  campaigns	  (Chang	  2008;	  Huang	  2004).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  government	  released	  the	  shares	  of	  the	  SOEs	  to	  the	  security	  market,	  yet	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  party	  set	  up	  investment	  companies	  and	  bought	  back	  these	  shares.	  For	  example,	  the	  KMT	  established	  investment	  companies	  like	  China	  Development,	  Jinghua	  Securities,	  Huaxin	  Bank	  to	  buy	  back	  the	  shares	  of	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former	  SOEs2	  (Chang	  2008).	  As	  Huang	  suggests,	  the	  expansion	  of	  party-­‐owned	  assets	  was	  multi-­‐dimensional	  (Huang	  2004).	  It	  involved	  acquisition	  from	  real	  estate,	  to	  manufacturing	  industries	  to	  high-­‐tech	  sector.	  The	  process	  of	  privatization	  of	  the	  SOEs	  blurred	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  party	  and	  the	  business.	  Business	  that	  had	  close	  business	  connections	  with	  the	  party-­‐owned	  enterprises	  could	  have	  favorable	  business	  opportunities	  and	  political	  connections.	  The	  privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprise	  and	  the	  separation	  of	  party	  and	  state	  created	  the	  new	  opportunity	  of	  rent-­‐seeking	  for	  politicians	  and	  businessmen.	  The	  KMT	  party,	  abusing	  its	  political	  power,	  undermined	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  consolidated	  central	  business	  association	  by	  providing	  selective	  benefits	  not	  to	  the	  business	  associations	  but	  to	  individual	  business	  groups	  and	  companies.	  	  	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  peak	  business	  associations	  in	  Taiwan	  gained	  greater	  autonomy	  after	  democratization,	  the	  state	  corporatist	  structure	  was	  not	  successfully	  transformed	  into	  a	  societal	  corporatist	  structure.	  The	  business	  sector	  in	  Taiwan,	  instead	  of	  retaking	  the	  corporatist	  structure	  that	  the	  party	  state	  created	  was	  busy	  seeking	  rents	  and	  individualistic	  benefits	  that	  the	  KMT	  government	  offered.	  Party	  politics	  and	  the	  growing	  electoral	  politics	  acted	  as	  a	  divisive	  force	  in	  the	  transformation	  to	  a	  corporatist	  system	  in	  Taiwan.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  negative	  effect	  of	  electoral	  politics	  on	  business	  unity	  is	  seen	  in	  Chen	  Shui	  Bian’s	  regime.	  In	  2000,	  the	  opposition	  DPP	  party,	  won	  the	  presidential	  election	  and	  Chen	  Shui	  Bian	  became	  president.	  Soon	  in	  2001,	  the	  DPP	  won	  a	  majority	  in	  the	  Legislative	  Yuan.	  In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  DPP	  took	  control	  of	  both	  the	  executive	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  details,	  see	  Chang	  2008,	  Huang	  2004	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legislative	  in	  Taiwan	  (Wang	  2004;	  Huang	  2004).	  During	  the	  electoral	  campaign,	  Chen	  and	  his	  party	  severely	  criticized	  the	  money	  politics	  that	  Lee	  Teng-­‐hui	  regime	  practiced,	  and	  promised	  a	  clean	  and	  uncorrupted	  government.	  The	  DPP	  criticized	  the	  rent-­‐seeking	  business	  groups	  and	  took	  a	  rather	  anti-­‐business	  attitude.	  However,	  soon	  after	  his	  inauguration,	  his	  government	  started	  to	  patronize	  businesses	  groups	  and	  establish	  political	  support	  in	  the	  business	  class.	  For	  example,	  he	  courted	  Zhang	  Rongfa,	  a	  Taiwanese	  businessman	  who	  had	  close	  ties	  with	  the	  former	  president	  and	  had	  strong	  indigenous	  sentiments,	  and	  supported	  him	  to	  run	  for	  the	  chairman	  of	  China	  National	  Association	  of	  Industries	  and	  Commerce	  (Huang	  2004).	  Besides,	  he	  promoted	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Small-­‐and-­‐Medium	  Enterprises.	  According	  to	  Huang,	  Chen	  and	  his	  government	  began	  to	  alienate	  and	  marginalize	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  KMT	  dominated	  NFI,	  NFC,	  and	  the	  NCIC.	  Chen	  began	  to	  mention	  the	  peak	  associations	  as	  the	  Big	  Six,	  instead	  of	  the	  Big	  Three,	  which	  included	  the	  DPP-­‐supported	  NASME	  and	  CNAIC3	  (Wang	  2004;	  Huang	  2004).	  During	  his	  terms,	  business	  associations	  began	  to	  compete	  for	  memberships	  and	  influence.	  Business	  representation	  became	  increasingly	  politicized.	  Party	  politics	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  divisive	  force	  in	  business	  representation.	  The	  political	  interest	  of	  politicians	  overruled	  the	  economic	  possibility	  of	  a	  coordinated	  business	  sector	  in	  Taiwan.	  Business	  associations	  became	  increasingly	  pluralist,	  competitive,	  and	  fragmental.	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  see	  that	  party	  politics	  as	  Martin	  and	  Swank	  suggest	  created	  a	  divisive	  force	  to	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  business	  class,	  making	  the	  transition	  from	  state-­‐corporatism	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  sixth	  is	  the	  Taiwan	  Electrical	  and	  Electronics	  Association,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  a	  peak	  business	  association.	  It	  is	  not	  concerned	  in	  this	  analysis	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societal	  corporatism	  more	  difficult.	  Intensified	  electoral	  politics	  incentivized	  the	  political	  parties	  to	  seek	  support	  of	  the	  businesses,	  in	  turn	  polarizing	  and	  politicizing	  business	  associations,	  making	  the	  organizational	  effort	  of	  business	  actors	  more	  difficult.	  	  
	  
Labor	  in	  Taiwan:	  Too	  weak	  a	  force	  for	  the	  employers	  to	  unite?	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  would	  expect,	  as	  the	  literature	  suggests,	  that	  the	  labor	  movement	  in	  Taiwan	  should	  have	  created	  incentives	  for	  the	  businesses	  to	  organize.	  However,	  we	  do	  not	  see	  that	  labor	  movement	  having	  a	  great	  impact	  on	  the	  strength	  and	  structure	  of	  business	  interest	  organization.	  The	  labor	  movement	  in	  Taiwan	  was	  too	  weak	  and	  particularistic	  that	  it	  failed	  to	  pressure	  the	  businesses	  to	  organize.	  Moreover,	  activists	  have	  spent	  greater	  effort	  on	  independent	  unionism	  than	  on	  collective	  actions.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  these	  reasons	  that	  the	  labor	  movement	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  1980s	  did	  not	  create	  an	  incentives	  for	  the	  Taiwanese	  businesses	  to	  organize.	  	  	  	  	  Labor	  politics	  in	  Taiwan	  was	  also	  under	  great	  transformation	  in	  the	  1980s.	  The	  lift	  of	  the	  martial	  law	  in	  1987	  and	  the	  democratization	  in	  the	  1990s	  indeed	  created	  conditions	  for	  a	  more	  autonomous	  labor	  unionism	  and	  activism.	  According	  to	  Hsiao	  and	  Ho,	  the	  number	  of	  industrial	  unions	  increased	  from	  1160	  in	  1987	  to	  1354	  in	  1990.	  (Ho	  2006)	  Labor	  dispute	  has	  also	  increased	  greatly	  from	  1981	  to	  1988,	  there	  were	  10,441,	  compared	  to	  4048	  cases	  between	  1971-­‐1980.	  In	  1989,	  alone,	  there	  were	  1,009	  cases	  of	  labor	  disputes	  (Hsiao	  1992).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  When	  the	  martial	  law	  was	  lifted,	  workers	  grasped	  this	  opportunity	  to	  organize,	  yet	  instead	  of	  immediately	  organizing	  strikes	  on	  the	  streets,	  the	  Taiwanese	  labor	  
Aaron	  Tsang	  Political	  Science	  Undergraduate	  Honor	  Thesis	  	  
	  
39	  
activists	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  organizing	  autonomous	  unions.	  They	  created	  autonomous	  unions	  in	  firms	  where	  they	  had	  been	  no	  unions	  during	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  and	  attempted	  to	  control	  the	  unions	  in	  large	  SOEs	  and	  large	  firms	  where	  union	  leaders	  were	  once	  predominantly	  KMT	  members	  (Hsiao	  1992;	  Ho	  2006).	  	  	  	  	  	  Despite	  the	  effort	  to	  create	  inter-­‐union	  solidarity,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  unified	  cross-­‐sector	  independent	  peak	  association	  has	  been	  largely	  unsuccessful.	  The	  labor	  movement	  like	  that	  in	  South	  Korea,	  resulted	  in	  the	  division	  of	  the	  labor	  force,	  thus	  weakening	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  labor	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  For	  example,	  in	  September	  1987,	  the	  Brotherhood	  Union	  was	  formed	  in	  December	  1987	  to	  strive	  for	  year-­‐end	  bonus.	  Similarly,	  in	  April	  1988,	  the	  Association	  of	  Union	  Cadres	  in	  southern	  Taiwan	  and	  the	  Kaohsiung	  Workers’	  Alliance	  were	  created	  to	  strive	  for	  solidarity	  among	  workers	  in	  the	  south	  and	  in	  the	  industrial	  city	  Kaohsiung	  (Hsiao	  1992).	  The	  National	  Federation	  of	  Independent	  Trade	  Unions,	  which	  later	  became	  the	  ultimate	  competitor	  of	  the	  state-­‐sponsored	  Chinese	  Federation	  of	  Labor,	  was	  formed	  in	  May	  1988	  (Ho	  2006).	  The	  mobilization	  efforts	  at	  the	  national	  level	  did	  not	  result	  in	  the	  replacement	  of	  the	  state-­‐corporatist	  CFL,	  but	  what	  were	  resulted	  in	  was	  the	  coexistence	  of	  the	  old	  and	  the	  new	  institutions.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  unions	  organized	  strikes	  and	  demonstrations,	  but	  all	  of	  them	  failed	  to	  mobilize	  cross-­‐sectorial	  and	  inter-­‐regional	  support.	  For	  example,	  the	  workers	  in	  Far	  Eastern	  Chemical	  Fibers	  held	  a	  strike	  in	  1989	  but	  were	  swiftly	  suppressed	  by	  the	  police.	  In	  1992,	  the	  Keelung	  Bus	  Company	  Union	  organized	  a	  strike	  but	  the	  police	  again	  suppressed	  the	  strike	  and	  bus	  drivers	  and	  couches	  from	  other	  areas	  were	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transported	  to	  break	  the	  strike	  (Ho	  2006).	  The	  police	  remained	  constantly	  supportive	  to	  the	  business	  and	  in	  both	  cases.	  Businesses	  in	  Taiwan	  were	  not	  as	  pressed	  by	  the	  labor	  movement	  as	  their	  Korean	  counterparts	  because	  of	  such	  state	  support.	  Besides,	  demands	  of	  the	  striking	  workers	  were	  particularistic	  and	  failed	  to	  mobilize	  national	  labor	  demonstration.	  Besides,	  legislations	  favoring	  employers	  were	  passed	  without	  significant	  labor	  opposition.	  For	  example,	  the	  Labor	  Union	  Law,	  which	  deregulate	  the	  union	  membership	  and	  allows	  parallel	  unionism	  in	  the	  same	  firm,	  was	  passed,	  including	  the	  Labor	  Dispute	  Law	  and	  the	  Labor	  Standard	  Law	  (Ho	  2006).	  We	  see	  that	  the	  labor	  militancy	  in	  Taiwan	  was	  too	  weak	  to	  gain	  political	  bargaining	  power	  in	  the	  polity.	  It	  had	  little	  power	  to	  alter	  the	  incentives	  of	  for	  the	  business	  to	  organize	  and	  conduct	  collective	  actions.	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  see	  the	  efforts	  of	  labor	  activists	  in	  Taiwan	  focused	  more	  on	  union	  organization	  than	  on	  demonstrations	  and	  strikes.	  With	  little	  doubt,	  the	  activists	  had	  reasonable	  success	  in	  union	  organization.	  Numerous	  regional	  confederations	  of	  independent	  unions	  were	  created	  in	  DPP	  controlled	  counties	  and	  municipalities	  (Ho	  2006).	  However,	  there	  were	  no	  cross-­‐sectorial	  efforts	  of	  collective	  bargaining	  and	  general	  strike	  to	  show	  solidarity	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  With	  most	  labor	  activism	  effectively	  solved	  within	  the	  boundary	  of	  the	  enterprises,	  employers	  in	  Taiwan	  had	  little	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  national-­‐wide	  business	  association	  to	  settle	  labor	  disputes	  and	  handle	  collective	  bargaining.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Taiwan	  and	  South	  Korea	  responded	  to	  the	  forces	  of	  democratization	  and	  economic	  liberalization	  very	  differently.	  Democratization	  in	  Taiwan	  created	  a	  strong	  
Aaron	  Tsang	  Political	  Science	  Undergraduate	  Honor	  Thesis	  	  
	  
41	  
opposition	  party	  competing	  with	  the	  incumbent	  KMT	  party-­‐state	  and	  a	  greater	  state-­‐business	  collusion.	  The	  state	  hostility	  towards	  business	  or	  the	  society	  moral	  censure,	  which	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  creating	  incentives	  for	  business	  organization,	  did	  not	  have	  any	  impact	  on	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  Taiwan.	  The	  liberalization	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  privatization	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  provided	  more	  autonomy	  to	  the	  business	  sector,	  yet	  in	  the	  process,	  the	  state	  provided	  individualistic	  benefits	  to	  individual	  firms	  but	  not	  selective	  benefits	  to	  the	  central	  peak	  association.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  short,	  party	  politics	  plays	  a	  more	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  businesses	  to	  organize,	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  create	  an	  encompassing	  peak	  business	  association.	  Party	  politics	  became	  a	  divisive	  force	  of	  the	  development	  of	  business	  associations	  in	  Taiwan.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  labor	  militancy	  in	  Taiwan	  was	  too	  weak	  to	  pressure	  the	  businesses	  to	  organize	  and	  coordinate.	  Strikes	  in	  Taiwan	  were	  unorganized	  and	  particularistic.	  The	  efforts	  of	  labor	  activists	  were	  focused	  more	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  independent	  unions.	  In	  contrast	  to	  party	  politics,	  the	  labor	  movement	  in	  Taiwan	  did	  not	  have	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  businesses	  to	  organize.	  	  
	  
Case	  2:	  South	  Korea	  
The	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Korean	  Business	  Associations	  	  	  	  	  The	  case	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  South	  Korea	  will	  follow	  a	  similar	  structure	  as	  that	  of	  Taiwan.	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  business	  and	  labor	  interest	  organization	  under	  the	  military	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  examine	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the	  business-­‐state	  relations	  under	  a	  chaebol-­‐led	  industrialization	  project	  during	  the	  Park	  Chung	  Hee	  era.	  I	  suggest	  that	  social	  interests	  in	  South	  Korea	  were	  also	  had	  the	  formal	  state-­‐corporatist	  organizational	  structure,	  yet	  the	  power	  dynamics	  was	  different	  from	  that	  in	  Taiwan.	  The	  South	  Korean	  developmental	  state	  adopted	  a	  chaebol-­‐led	  industrialization	  strategy,	  thus	  the	  state-­‐business	  relation	  in	  South	  Korea	  was	  closer	  than	  that	  in	  Taiwan.	  The	  labor	  unions	  were	  controlled	  and	  manipulated	  not	  by	  the	  state	  but	  by	  the	  firms,	  and	  the	  chaebols	  since	  1961,	  had	  an	  encompassing	  and	  relatively	  autonomous	  business	  association,	  the	  Korean	  Federation	  of	  Industries.	  These	  conditions,	  I	  argue,	  created	  more	  favorable	  conditions	  for	  an	  autonomous,	  encompassing,	  and	  more	  corporatist	  business	  organizational	  structure	  in	  South	  Korea	  in	  the	  post-­‐developmentalist	  era.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  second	  part,	  I	  will	  examine	  how	  state,	  business	  and	  labor	  actors	  responded	  to	  the	  forces	  of	  economic	  liberalization	  and	  democratization	  and	  how	  these	  forces	  reshaped	  the	  strength	  and	  organization	  of	  the	  business	  associations	  in	  South	  Korea.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  dynamics	  of	  economic	  liberalization	  was	  played	  out	  differently	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan.	  The	  growing	  current	  of	  democratization	  in	  South	  Korea	  since	  the	  1980s	  had	  pressured	  the	  state	  to	  curb	  the	  oligopolistic	  chaebols	  in	  Korea.	  Politicians,	  in	  response	  to	  popular	  pressure	  and	  economic	  realities,	  pursued	  anti-­‐trust	  and	  corporate	  restructuring	  policies	  that	  irritated	  the	  business	  community	  in	  general.	  With	  a	  general	  disgruntlement	  of	  social	  inequality	  and	  concentration	  of	  wealth,	  we	  do	  not	  competition	  for	  business	  support	  among	  the	  political	  parties,	  yet	  we	  see	  a	  greater	  solidarity	  among	  the	  chaebols	  in	  response	  to	  the	  anti-­‐trust	  and	  corporate	  restructuring	  policies.	  The	  actions	  of	  the	  state	  negatively	  incentivized	  the	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business	  to	  strengthen	  their	  peak	  associations	  and	  conduct	  a	  variety	  of	  collective	  actions.	  	  	  	  	  	  Second,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  growing	  labor	  militancy	  forced	  the	  chaebols	  to	  organize	  and	  strengthen	  the	  employer	  association	  of	  the	  chaebols.	  In	  1987,	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  wave	  of	  labor	  strikes	  occurred	  in	  South	  Korea.	  With	  the	  state	  backed-­‐off	  from	  the	  strike,	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  had	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  strengthen	  their	  employer	  association	  to	  combat	  labor	  militancy.	  The	  empowerment	  of	  labor,	  I	  argue	  has	  caused	  the	  large	  businesses	  in	  South	  Korea	  to	  organize	  and	  conduct	  collective	  actions.	  	  	  
Social	  Control	  and	  state-­‐corporatism	  under	  the	  Korean	  military	  regime	  	  	  	  After	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  Korean	  peninsula	  was	  divided	  into	  two.	  The	  North	  was	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐supported	  communist	  regime,	  while	  the	  south	  was	  controlled	  by	  the	  US-­‐supported	  authoritarian	  regime.	  In	  the	  South,	  despite	  the	  promise	  of	  democracy,	  there	  were	  great	  suppression	  and	  policing.	  Labor	  unionism	  was	  suppressed	  and	  pre-­‐empted.	  The	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  South	  Korea	  retained	  under	  democratization	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  	  	  	  	  Most	  parts	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  were	  organized	  under	  state-­‐corporatist	  lines.	  For	  instance,	  business	  organizations	  were	  organized	  in	  a	  singular,	  compulsory,	  non-­‐competitive,	  hierarchically	  ordered	  and	  functionally	  differentiated	  peak	  association,	  the	  Korean	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  and	  Industry	  (KCCI)	  had	  monopoly	  of	  representation	  among	  the	  business	  class	  in	  South	  Korea	  since	  the	  law	  mandated	  all	  businesses	  to	  join	  the	  KCCI	  (Fields	  1999).	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  Not	  only	  were	  the	  chambers	  of	  commerce	  organized	  in	  a	  state-­‐corporatist	  fashion,	  so	  were	  the	  sectorial	  and	  trade	  associations.	  According	  to	  Park,	  there	  were	  around	  2172	  sector-­‐based	  business	  associations	  in	  South	  Korea	  in	  1970,	  all	  granted	  by	  the	  regime	  with	  monopoly	  of	  representation	  (Park	  1987).	  For	  example,	  the	  Korean	  Textile	  Association	  had	  monopoly	  of	  representation	  in	  the	  textile	  industry,	  while	  the	  Korean	  Traders	  Association	  had	  monopoly	  of	  representation	  in	  the	  trade	  sector	  (Park	  1987).	  	  	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  military	  regime	  also	  had	  a	  state-­‐corporatist	  organizational	  structure	  to	  preempt	  independent	  unionism,	  the	  Korean	  military	  regime	  had	  less	  penetration	  and	  control	  over	  the	  labor	  force	  compared	  to	  its	  Taiwanese	  counterpart.	  Similar	  to	  Taiwan,	  labor	  under	  Park’s	  military	  authoritarian	  regime	  was	  organized	  in	  a	  state-­‐corporatist	  manner.	  The	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  Trade	  Unions	  (FKTU),	  a	  state-­‐sponsored	  peak	  association,	  was	  the	  only	  authorized	  peak	  labor	  union	  (Park	  1987;	  Koo	  2001).	  Yet	  the	  military	  state	  did	  not	  fully	  grapple	  with	  the	  labor	  organizations.	  The	  FKTU	  was	  created	  under	  American	  supervision	  in	  the	  1940s	  primarily	  to	  fight	  against	  communists	  and	  leftist	  unionist.	  It	  was	  organized	  bureaucratically	  and	  had	  very	  limited	  popular	  base	  (Park	  1987).	  	  	  	  	  	  Enterprise	  unions	  were	  managed	  and	  controlled	  by	  the	  chaebols	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  state.	  Union	  leaders	  were	  usually	  selected	  and	  paid	  by	  the	  employers,	  so	  union	  officials	  were	  most	  of	  the	  time	  loyal	  conformists	  rather	  than	  militant	  and	  resistant	  activists	  were	  selected.	  Unions	  were	  nominally	  structured	  under	  the	  state-­‐corporatist	  tree,	  but	  usually	  organized	  in	  the	  enterprise	  level	  and	  manipulated	  by	  employers	  (Park	  1987).	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  The	  state	  had	  little	  control	  over	  the	  labor	  force	  other	  than	  monitoring	  through	  the	  KCIA	  and	  the	  negative	  feedback	  mechanism	  of	  violent	  suppression	  whenever	  there	  was	  a	  strike.	  Despite	  the	  relatively	  weaker	  penetration	  compared	  to	  the	  Leninist	  party-­‐state	  in	  Taiwan,	  interest	  groups,	  with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  the	  FKI,	  had	  little	  autonomy	  and	  freedom	  to	  conduct	  collective	  actions.	  The	  civil	  society	  was	  largely	  controlled	  and	  monitored	  by	  the	  military	  regime	  in	  South	  Korea.	  	  	  
Chaebol-­‐led	  economic	  development	  and	  the	  Symbiotic	  State-­‐Business	  Relations	  	  	  	  	  Chaebols,	  or	  family-­‐owned	  business-­‐conglomerates,	  were	  the	  sources	  of	  growth	  during	  the	  developmental	  period	  in	  the	  1960-­‐1980s,	  and	  remained	  the	  dominant	  player	  in	  the	  Korean	  economy	  up	  to	  this	  day.	  The	  earliest	  chaebols	  were	  originated	  in	  the	  colonial	  period	  (1910-­‐1945),	  where	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  Korean	  merchants	  took	  part	  in	  the	  trade	  or	  even	  the	  industry	  (Kim	  1997).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  After	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  Lee	  Syngmun	  regime	  (1948-­‐1960)	  initially	  adopted	  the	  import-­‐substitution	  strategy	  of	  economic	  development.	  The	  Lee	  regime	  created	  a	  large	  corrupted	  network	  of	  interest	  among	  big	  business,	  the	  bureaucracy,	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Party	  through	  the	  distribution	  of	  US	  aid	  funds	  and	  projects	  based	  largely	  on	  patronage	  and	  nepotism.	  Big	  business	  sought	  rent	  by	  colluding	  with	  the	  state	  while	  the	  regime	  under	  Lee	  co-­‐opted	  businesses	  for	  political	  funds	  and	  support	  (Kim	  1997;	  Eckert	  1993;	  Woo	  1992).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	  was	  since	  General	  Park	  Chung	  Hee	  took	  power	  that	  the	  chaebols	  have	  fully	  taken	  off.	  The	  Rhee	  regime	  was	  ousted	  by	  the	  student	  protest	  in	  1960.	  Chang	  Myon,	  the	  prime	  minister	  took	  power	  and	  Yun	  Bo-­‐seon	  became	  president.	  The	  short-­‐lived	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democratic	  regime	  in	  1960s	  was	  then	  ousted	  by	  the	  military	  coup	  led	  by	  Park	  Chung	  Hee.	  At	  first,	  Park	  arrested	  all	  the	  capitalists	  and	  charged	  them	  with	  illicit	  accumulation	  of	  wealth,	  but	  later	  realized	  that	  his	  vision	  of	  “Rich	  Nation,	  Strong	  Army”	  could	  not	  be	  fulfilled	  without	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  chaebols.	  Park	  later	  renegotiated	  with	  the	  capitalists	  and	  eventually	  formed	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  chaebols.	  Park	  Chung	  Hee	  then	  established	  the	  Economic	  Planning	  Board	  in	  1961	  and	  launched	  the	  First	  Five	  Year	  Economic	  Development	  Plan	  in	  1962	  (Kim	  and	  Park	  2011).	  Capitalists	  whom	  Park	  believed	  to	  have	  the	  entrepreneurial	  spirit,	  for	  example	  Chung	  Chu	  Yong	  of	  Hyundai,	  were	  chosen	  in	  participate	  in	  the	  state-­‐led	  developmental	  plan	  (Kim	  and	  Park	  2011;	  EM	  Kim	  1997).	  	  	  	  	  	  Since	  1961,	  the	  chaebols	  were	  in	  close	  ties	  with	  the	  government	  and	  enjoyed	  economic	  privileges.	  The	  state	  provided	  state	  guaranteed	  foreign	  loans	  and	  subsidized	  bank	  loans	  to	  develop	  and	  expand	  their	  businesses.	  The	  chaebols	  started	  with	  light	  industries	  like	  textile	  (Kim	  1997).	  In	  1970s,	  because	  of	  the	  growing	  neo-­‐protectionism	  of	  the	  advanced	  industrialized	  countries,	  in	  particular,	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Park	  regime	  announced	  the	  Emergency	  Decree	  for	  Economic	  Stability	  and	  Growth.	  In	  1972,	  Park	  initiated	  a	  “self-­‐coup”	  and	  an	  amendment	  of	  the	  constitution,	  the	  Yushin	  constitution,	  and	  initiated	  the	  Heavy	  and	  Chemical	  Industry	  Project,	  where	  the	  chaebols	  took	  part	  in	  heavy	  industries	  like	  petrochemical,	  automobiles,	  and	  steel	  (Kim	  1997;	  Kim	  and	  Park	  2011).	  Gradually,	  the	  chaebols	  grew	  and	  expanded	  rapidly	  under	  the	  tutelage	  of	  the	  developmental	  state.	  By	  1970s,	  the	  chaebols	  became	  large	  multi-­‐sectorial	  conglomerate	  groups	  that	  dominated	  both	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the	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  industries,	  both	  the	  export	  market	  and	  the	  domestic	  market	  (Kim	  and	  Park	  2011).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  chaebols	  not	  only	  had	  great	  economic	  prowess,	  they	  had	  the	  freedom	  to	  form	  their	  own	  pressure	  group,	  the	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  Industries,	  which	  worked	  largely	  outside	  the	  state-­‐corporatist	  system.	  The	  FKI	  was	  established	  as	  a	  summit	  organization	  and	  served	  as	  a	  channel	  to	  defend	  the	  collective	  interests	  of	  big	  businesses.	  For	  example,	  in	  1972,	  the	  FKI	  lobbied	  the	  state	  to	  reduce	  taxes,	  expand	  money	  supply,	  and	  order	  banks	  to	  take	  over	  the	  usurious	  curb	  loans	  to	  relieve	  debt	  burden	  of	  firms	  (Woo	  1991).	  The	  FKI	  also	  enabled	  the	  state	  to	  control,	  shape,	  and	  influence	  those	  interests	  and	  helped	  the	  state	  and	  the	  chaebols	  to	  negotiate	  the	  market	  shares	  required	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  industrial	  rationalization	  cartels,	  which	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  excessive	  competition	  among	  rival	  conglomerates	  (Kim	  and	  Park	  2011).	  	  	  	  	  	  More	  importantly,	  the	  FKI	  served	  as	  a	  channel	  for	  business	  and	  industrial	  ideas	  from	  the	  business	  sector	  to	  the	  state.	  According	  to	  Kim	  Ip-­‐sam,	  FKI	  executive	  vice-­‐chairman	  during	  the	  Park	  era,	  the	  FKI	  suggested	  important	  policy	  ideas	  to	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  to	  Park,	  including	  the	  construction	  of	  Ulsan	  Industrial	  Complex,	  the	  strategy	  of	  export	  promotion,	  and	  the	  strategy	  of	  attracting	  foreign	  capital	  and	  commercial	  loans	  (Kim	  1997;	  Kim	  and	  Park	  2011).	  	  	  	  	  	  Besides,	  the	  economic	  reasons,	  Park	  organized	  the	  FKI	  to	  monopolize	  the	  political	  loyalty	  of	  its	  members	  and	  preempt	  not	  only	  the	  opposition	  but	  also	  his	  potential	  rivals	  within	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  from	  securing	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  political	  funds	  (Kim	  and	  Park	  2011).	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  Regardless	  of	  the	  economic	  prowess	  of	  the	  chaebols	  during	  the	  developmentalist	  era,	  the	  chaebols	  could	  never	  openly	  challenge	  the	  state.	  They	  were	  still	  dependent	  on	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  state	  in	  three	  ways.	  First,	  the	  state	  controlled	  the	  sources	  of	  finance.	  Immediately	  after	  the	  coup	  in	  1961,	  the	  Park	  military	  junta	  nationalized	  all	  the	  commercial	  banks	  in	  South	  Korea	  while	  bank-­‐loan	  and	  indirect	  foreign	  investment	  through	  savings	  remained	  the	  primary	  sources	  of	  finance	  of	  the	  chaebols,	  the	  state-­‐controlled	  finance	  kept	  the	  businesses	  dependent	  on	  the	  state	  and	  served	  as	  both	  a	  carrot	  and	  a	  stick	  that	  ensured	  businesses	  to	  follow	  the	  developmental	  plan	  of	  the	  developmental	  state.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  state	  provided	  policy	  loans	  and	  preferential	  borrowing	  to	  the	  collaborative	  chaebols.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  monopoly	  of	  finance	  could	  force	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  subordinate	  corporate	  interest	  to	  policy	  objectives.	  Private	  businesses	  would	  risk	  financial	  dried-­‐up	  if	  they	  failed	  to	  reach	  the	  target	  of	  the	  developmental	  state,	  or	  if	  they	  openly	  confronted	  with	  the	  military	  authority.	  The	  control	  over	  finance	  kept	  the	  businesses	  in	  place	  and	  minimized	  the	  potential	  principal-­‐agency	  problem	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  state-­‐guided	  industrialization	  (Woo	  1991;	  Eckert	  1993).	  	  	  	  	  	  Secondly,	  the	  chaebols	  were	  constrained	  by	  the	  business	  because	  the	  state	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  allocate	  business	  licenses.	  The	  state’s	  control	  of	  licensure	  defined	  and	  limited	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  firm’s	  activities,	  since	  the	  chaebols	  had	  to	  obtain	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  state	  in	  order	  to	  establish,	  modify,	  or	  expand	  their	  companies.	  The	  control	  of	  market	  access	  was	  decided	  by	  the	  state,	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  chaebols	  was	  indirectly	  dependent	  on	  the	  will	  of	  the	  state	  (Eckert	  1993).	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  Third,	  the	  state	  controlled	  the	  Korean	  business	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  National	  Tax	  Administration	  (ONTA).	  The	  office	  managed	  the	  corporate	  taxes	  and	  had	  the	  power	  to	  declare	  a	  firm	  guilty	  of	  tax	  evasion	  that	  would	  result	  in	  not	  only	  additional	  tax	  payment	  and	  penalties	  but	  also	  criminal	  persecutions.	  The	  ONTA	  served	  as	  an	  effective	  tool	  of	  the	  military	  state	  to	  ensure	  that	  business	  profits	  and	  expenditures	  flow	  only	  into	  the	  approved	  areas.	  The	  office	  could	  effectively	  punish	  businessmen	  who	  have	  violated	  the	  state	  economic	  guidelines	  and	  regulations	  or	  somehow	  offended	  the	  government.	  The	  military	  government	  had	  used	  this	  tool	  to	  contain	  the	  chaebol	  power	  (Eckert	  1993).	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  see	  that	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  and	  the	  military	  state	  were	  in	  close	  partnership	  during	  the	  high	  growth	  period.	  The	  state	  tolerated	  relatively	  large	  autonomy	  in	  corporate	  governance	  and	  interest	  representation	  of	  the	  chaebols	  as	  long	  as	  they	  fulfilled	  the	  developmental	  plans	  and	  not	  involved	  in	  politics.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  developmental	  state	  provided	  generous	  economic	  privileges	  and	  financial	  incentives	  for	  the	  chaebols	  to	  fulfill	  the	  national	  economic	  development	  plan	  envisioned	  by	  Park.	  Yet	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  military	  government	  was	  still	  holding	  tight	  control	  of	  the	  business	  sectors	  through	  the	  control	  of	  finance,	  business	  licensure,	  and	  the	  judicial	  system.	  Despite	  the	  relatively	  symbiotic	  relationship,	  the	  state	  was	  still	  the	  hegemon	  in	  this	  relationship.	  	  	  	  	  	  Unlike	  the	  clear	  division	  of	  labor	  between	  large	  SOEs	  upstream	  industries	  and	  SMEs	  in	  the	  downstream	  industries	  in	  Taiwan,	  the	  private	  sectors	  in	  South	  Korea	  could	  participate	  in	  nearly	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	  family-­‐owned	  business	  conglomerates,	  or	  the	  chaebols,	  were	  able	  to	  expand	  their	  businesses	  in	  multiple	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sectors	  under	  the	  tutelage	  and	  support	  of	  the	  developmental	  state.	  The	  control	  of	  the	  chaebols	  over	  the	  market	  was	  immense.	  According	  to	  Fields,	  in	  1983	  the	  top	  fifty	  chaebols	  had	  sales	  equivalent	  to	  nearly	  94%	  of	  GNP.	  In	  1986,	  the	  top	  ten	  chaebols	  had	  total	  sales	  of	  over	  US$65	  billion,	  more	  than	  65%	  of	  Korea’s	  1986	  GNP.	  In	  1991,	  the	  top	  five	  chaebols	  have	  revenues	  of	  US$	  116	  billion,	  equivalent	  to	  just	  under	  half	  of	  Korea’s	  1991	  GNP	  (Fields	  1995).	  With	  such	  economic	  concentration,	  the	  neoliberal	  reform	  and	  economic	  restructuring	  carries	  different	  meanings	  different	  things	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  in	  Taiwan.	  	  	  
The	  Great	  Transformation	  in	  South	  Korea:	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Crisis	  in	  the	  1980s	  
and	  1990s	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  assassination	  of	  Park	  Chung	  Hee	  and	  the	  military	  coup	  led	  by	  Chun	  Doo	  Hwan	  signified	  a	  gradual	  change	  in	  state-­‐business	  relations,	  and	  thus	  the	  incentives	  for	  businesses	  to	  organize.	  The	  Chun	  regime	  had	  little	  legitimacy	  in	  Korean	  politics.	  Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  term,	  the	  democratic	  movement	  has	  escalated	  and	  has	  received	  greater	  sympathies	  and	  support	  from	  the	  Korean	  society.	  Besides,	  the	  economic	  problems	  caused	  largely	  by	  the	  overexpansion	  of	  Park’s	  Heavy	  and	  Chemical	  Industry	  projects	  have	  emerged.	  The	  growing	  economic	  inequality	  generated	  immense	  criticism	  on	  the	  tight	  state-­‐business	  partnership	  during	  the	  developmental	  era.	  The	  power	  dynamics	  was	  in	  gradual	  change	  in	  the	  1980s	  under	  the	  presidency	  of	  Chun	  Doo	  Hwan,	  and	  these	  changes	  in	  turn	  affect	  the	  incentives	  for	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  to	  organize.	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  Under	  these	  changing	  political	  and	  economic	  conditions,	  Chun	  adopted	  a	  different	  political	  strategy,	  which	  eventually	  forced	  the	  businesses	  to	  organize.	  At	  the	  political	  front,	  he	  joint	  the	  masses	  and	  criticized	  the	  greedy	  and	  immoral	  Korean	  capitalists	  and	  purged	  them	  to	  gain	  legitimacy	  (Moon	  1994).	  On	  the	  economic	  front,	  Chun	  privatized	  the	  commercial	  banks	  with	  deliberate	  exclusion	  of	  the	  chaebols,	  and	  adopted	  policies	  to	  streamline	  the	  corporate	  structure	  of	  the	  chaebols	  and	  reduce	  the	  economic	  concentration	  of	  the	  chaebols	  (Moon	  1994;	  Lin	  2010).	  On	  both	  fronts,	  the	  changing	  attitude	  of	  the	  state	  towards	  business	  forced	  the	  chaebols	  to	  organize	  and	  invest	  in	  collective	  actions	  to	  resist	  the	  increasingly	  unfavorable	  economic	  policies	  and	  the	  growingly	  hostile	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  Apart	  from	  the	  political	  crisis,	  the	  labor	  movement	  also	  forced	  businesses	  to	  organize	  themselves.	  In	  1987,	  a	  great	  wave	  of	  labor	  offensive	  broke	  out.	  Workers	  in	  Hyundai	  Heavy	  Industry	  led	  a	  strike	  in	  Ulsan,	  and	  the	  movement	  was	  later	  spread	  to	  the	  entire	  Hyundai	  group	  and	  eventually	  throughout	  the	  nation.	  The	  Chun	  weakened	  authoritarian	  regime,	  which	  was	  struggling	  for	  political	  survival,	  	  was	  reluctant	  to	  suppress	  the	  strike	  leaving	  the	  chaebols	  unprotected	  in	  the	  labor	  movement.	  The	  unprecedented	  scale	  of	  labor	  movement	  forced	  businesses	  to	  organize	  themselves	  and	  strenthened	  the	  Korean	  Employers	  Federation	  (KEF)	  to	  battle	  labor	  activism,	  strike	  deals,	  and	  collective	  bargain	  with	  labor	  (Koo	  2001;	  Scheldon	  and	  Jun	  2006).	  	  	  	  	  	  With	  these	  economic	  and	  political	  changes,	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  started	  to	  organize	  autonomously	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  The	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  Industries	  and	  the	  Korean	  Employer	  Associations,	  which	  were	  closely	  connected	  and	  both	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financed	  largely	  by	  the	  large	  enterprises,	  became	  increasingly	  important	  in	  areas	  of	  economic	  policy	  as	  well	  as	  labor	  relations.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  we	  will	  elaborate	  on	  how	  these	  political	  and	  economic	  changes	  shape	  the	  business	  associations	  in	  South	  Korea.	  	  	  	  
Wrestling	  with	  the	  hostile	  state:	  business	  association	  as	  a	  response	  to	  purges	  of	  
capitalists	  and	  neoliberal	  reforms	  	  	  	  	  	  Chun	  Doo	  Hwan	  had	  inherited	  a	  very	  difficult	  political	  situation	  from	  his	  predecessor.	  Chun	  took	  power	  at	  a	  time	  of	  growing	  voice	  for	  democratization,	  the	  society	  was	  flooded	  with	  complaints	  and	  grievances	  about	  the	  economic	  inequality	  and	  social	  injustice	  that	  the	  developmental	  state	  had	  created	  had	  started	  to	  evolve.	  The	  problems	  of	  economic	  overexpansion	  under	  Park’s	  Heavy	  and	  Chemical	  Industry	  had	  also	  emerging.	  The	  Chun	  regime	  faced	  great	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  challenges.	  	  	  	  	  	  Economically,	  Korea	  faced	  the	  greatest	  economic	  difficulty	  since	  the	  Korean	  War.	  In	  1980,	  the	  year	  Chun	  took	  control,	  South	  Korea	  experienced	  a	  negative	  GNP	  growth	  which	  had	  not	  happen	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Politically,	  Chun’s	  fledging	  regime	  was	  vulnerable	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  the	  growing	  voice	  of	  democracy.	  Out	  of	  political	  calculation,	  Chun’s	  regime	  decided	  to	  break	  the	  pact	  with	  the	  chaebols	  and	  dismantle	  the	  developmental	  state.	  Such	  move	  allowed	  Chun	  to	  blame	  the	  chaebols	  for	  all	  the	  economic	  hardship	  and	  thus	  gain	  greater	  popular	  support	  (Moon	  1994).	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  For	  political	  survival,	  Chun	  purged	  the	  Korean	  capitalists	  and	  attacked	  the	  chaebols	  under	  the	  name	  of	  the	  “social	  purification”.	  The	  businessmen	  were	  accused	  of	  corruption,	  money-­‐laundering,	  and	  illicit	  accumulation	  of	  wealth.	  The	  regime	  manipulated	  the	  judicial	  system	  and	  “punished”	  the	  businessmen	  with	  fines,	  seizure	  of	  wealth,	  or	  even	  imprisonment	  (Moon	  1994).	  Besides,	  Chun	  Doo	  Hwan	  forced	  the	  chaebols	  to	  pay	  certain	  tributes	  to	  the	  state,	  including	  sports	  promotion,	  defense	  donation,	  crime	  prevention	  funds,	  rehabilitation	  funds,	  disaster	  relief	  funds,	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  Chun	  government	  publicly	  distanced	  itself	  from	  the	  chaebol	  and	  joined	  the	  masses	  in	  criticizing,	  blaming,	  or	  even	  punishing	  the	  “immorality	  and	  greediness	  of	  the	  chaebols“	  (Eckert	  1993;	  Lin	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  changing	  political	  and	  economic	  environment,	  the	  chaebols	  were	  pressured	  to	  organize	  autonomously	  to	  fight	  against	  a	  business-­‐hostile	  regime.	  The	  FKI	  became	  the	  platform	  and	  the	  collective	  voice	  of	  the	  chaebol.	  For	  instance,	  the	  chaebols	  reputed	  the	  accusation	  by	  the	  state,	  stating	  that	  it	  was	  not	  desirable	  for	  the	  government	  to	  make	  big	  businesses	  the	  scapegoat	  for	  the	  economic	  hardship	  in	  South	  Korea.	  In	  a	  public	  speech,	  Koo	  Cha	  Kyung,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  FKI	  and	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Lucky-­‐Goldstar	  groups	  proclaimed	  that	  attempts	  to	  punish	  big	  businesses	  would	  only	  exacerbate	  economic	  problems.	  In	  other	  press	  conference,	  Koo	  announced	  that	  “in	  the	  future	  the	  chaebols	  will	  collect	  all	  political	  funds	  openly	  within	  the	  business	  community,	  and	  we	  will	  distribute	  these	  funds	  only	  to	  those	  parties	  supporting	  a	  free-­‐market	  economy.”	  (Cited	  in	  Eckert	  1993).	  Whether	  these	  practices	  were	  actualized	  was	  not	  documented,	  but	  it	  clearly	  shows	  the	  blatant	  and	  
Aaron	  Tsang	  Political	  Science	  Undergraduate	  Honor	  Thesis	  	  
	  
54	  
confrontational	  stance	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  took	  towards	  the	  political	  authority,	  which	  was	  rare	  in	  Park	  Chung	  Hee’s	  era.	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  Chun’s	  regime	  criticized	  and	  purged	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  class	  publicly,	  it	  initiated	  policies	  that	  limited	  the	  power	  and	  domestic	  market	  share	  of	  the	  chaebols.	  Chun	  enacted	  the	  Monopoly	  Regulations	  and	  Fair	  Trade	  law	  that	  undercut	  the	  chaebols’	  domestic	  position.	  The	  law	  regulated	  cartelism,	  price	  monopoly,	  and	  “unfair	  competition.”	  Besides,	  the	  law	  prohibited	  cross-­‐investment	  between	  the	  subsidiaries	  of	  the	  chaebol	  group	  (Eckert	  1993;	  Lin	  2008).	  The	  FKI	  protested	  vehemently	  and	  in	  the	  end,	  the	  law	  was	  not	  enforced.	  Although	  the	  effort	  was	  finally	  aborted,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  Korean	  politicians	  were	  committed	  to	  streamline	  the	  corporate	  structure	  of	  the	  chaebols	  and	  carry	  out	  neoliberal	  reforms	  that	  might	  harm	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  oligarchic	  chaebols	  in	  South	  Korea.	  	  	  	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  Chun	  regime	  privatized	  the	  commercial	  banks	  without	  allowing	  the	  chaebols	  to	  enter	  the	  banking	  industry.	  	  The	  state	  restricted	  the	  entry	  of	  the	  chaebols	  in	  the	  banking	  industry	  by	  limiting	  the	  purchase	  of	  shares	  to	  no	  more	  than	  5%	  for	  each	  individual	  or	  enterprise.	  Besides,	  the	  state	  attempted	  to	  separate	  commerce	  and	  banking	  and	  planned	  to	  indirectly	  control	  the	  economic	  decisions	  of	  the	  chaebols	  through	  the	  appointment	  of	  chief	  executives	  of	  the	  commercial	  banks	  (Hahm	  2003).	  Besides,	  he	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  also	  shifted	  the	  priority	  of	  credit	  towards	  the	  SMEs,	  agriculture,	  fisheries,	  and	  mining	  in	  response	  to	  the	  social	  demands	  for	  equity,	  income	  redistribution,	  and	  balanced	  growth.	  The	  government	  tightened	  the	  credit	  control	  of	  the	  chaebols	  reduced	  the	  policy	  loans	  chaebols	  usually	  got	  in	  the	  past	  (Hahm	  2003).	  The	  FKI	  again	  protested	  against	  such	  policy	  on	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the	  one	  hand,	  and	  shifted	  their	  sources	  of	  corporate	  finance	  to	  non-­‐bank	  financial	  institutions	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  1980s,	  government	  actions,	  whether	  legitimate	  or	  not,	  have	  continued	  to	  create	  incentives	  for	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  to	  organize.	  The	  Roh	  Tae	  Woo	  regime	  after	  Chun	  continued	  to	  adopt	  the	  “co-­‐opt	  the	  middle	  class,	  squeeze	  the	  big	  business”	  strategy.	  Although	  there	  were	  recesses	  where	  the	  state	  reintroduced	  pro-­‐business	  policies,	  the	  Roh	  regime	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  chaebols.	  It	  blamed	  the	  big	  businesses	  for	  the	  skyrocketing	  stock	  and	  real	  estate	  prices.	  It	  also	  accused	  the	  state	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  growing	  income	  inequality	  in	  South	  Korea	  (Moon	  1994).	  The	  business-­‐hostile	  political	  rhetoric	  remained	  after	  Roh	  took	  power.	  	  	  	  	  	  Although	  much	  of	  the	  reform	  was	  unsuccessful	  and	  ineffective	  in	  the	  end,	  the	  chaebol	  sensed	  that	  the	  close	  state-­‐business	  relations	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  sustained.	  The	  business-­‐hostile	  political	  rhetoric	  created	  great	  uncertainty	  for	  the	  businesses.	  As	  the	  state	  continued	  to	  take	  a	  hostile	  stance	  towards	  the	  chaebols,	  the	  private	  sector	  continued	  to	  make	  efforts	  in	  organizing	  resistance	  and	  retaliation.	  The	  state-­‐business	  confrontation	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  was	  a	  crucial	  factor	  for	  the	  centralization	  and	  consolidation	  of	  business	  organization	  in	  South	  Korea.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Coping	  with	  angry	  workers:	  Business	  organization	  in	  response	  to	  labor	  militancy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Besides	  the	  growing	  political	  uncertainty	  due	  to	  democratization,	  the	  outburst	  of	  labor	  activism	  in	  the	  1980s	  created	  great	  incentives	  for	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  to	  organize	  and	  conduct	  collective	  actions.	  During	  the	  authoritarian	  developmental	  era,	  the	  military	  consistently	  suppressed	  labor	  strikes	  and	  intervened	  in	  labor	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disputes.	  The	  chaebols	  were	  free	  to	  pursue	  their	  labor-­‐cost-­‐minimization	  strategy	  and	  militaristic	  styles	  of	  labor	  management.	  Such	  practice	  was	  embedded	  in	  Park’s	  nationalistic	  rhetoric	  for	  national	  economic	  development	  and	  “Yushin.”	  (Koo	  2001)	  Seeing	  the	  rise	  of	  labor	  militancy	  in	  the	  light	  industries,	  the	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  Industries	  established	  the	  Korean	  Employers	  Association	  in	  1970	  (renamed	  as	  the	  Korean	  Employers	  Federation,	  or	  KEF	  in	  1981)	  to	  specialize	  in	  industrial	  relations.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  strong	  state	  support	  in	  labor	  suppression,	  there	  were	  little	  collective	  actions	  other	  than	  the	  provision	  of	  wage	  guidelines	  and	  consultation	  services	  (Jun	  and	  Sheldon	  2006).	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  suffered	  a	  great	  shock	  by	  the	  labor	  militancy.	  In	  1987,	  the	  Korean	  industrialists	  faced	  the	  greatest	  wave	  of	  labor	  strikes	  unseen	  in	  Korean	  history.	  The	  Great	  Workers’	  Struggle	  started	  in	  1987	  in	  June,	  two	  weeks	  after	  Roh	  Tae	  Woo,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  ruling	  Democratic	  Justice	  Party	  and	  the	  handpicked	  successor	  of	  the	  military	  dictator	  Chun	  Doo	  Hwon	  announced	  that	  the	  democratic	  presidential	  elections	  will	  be	  opened	  and	  constitutional	  amendment	  will	  be	  granted.	  The	  Grand	  Strike	  started	  in	  Hyundai	  Heavy	  Industries	  in	  Ulsan,	  and	  it	  later	  was	  spread	  to	  different	  subsidiaries	  of	  the	  chaebols	  and	  to	  other	  chaebol-­‐owned	  factories	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  Later	  Daewoo,	  Kia,	  Samsung,	  and	  Lucky-­‐Goldenstar	  factories	  in	  Pusan,	  Changwong,	  Masan,	  Kwangju,	  Chonju,	  Kunsan,	  Okku,	  Kimje,	  and	  even	  Seoul	  were	  affected.	  In	  the	  year	  of	  1987,	  there	  were	  1.2	  million	  workers	  on	  strikes	  in	  industries	  ranging	  from	  mining,	  manufacturing,	  dockyards,	  transportation,	  and	  service.	  In	  1987	  alone,	  there	  were	  3749	  strikes,	  compared	  to	  276	  in	  the	  year	  before	  (Koo	  2001).	  	  Workers	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attempted	  to	  formed	  independent,	  self-­‐governing	  unions	  first	  in	  the	  factory	  branch	  and	  later	  expanded	  to	  the	  whole	  business	  group.	  In	  1994,	  activists	  later	  established	  an	  independent	  national	  peak	  association,	  the	  Korean	  Confederation	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  (KCTU),	  attempting	  to	  replace	  the	  official	  state-­‐corporatist	  peak	  association,	  the	  Federation	  of	  Korean	  Trade	  Unions	  (FKTU).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  capitalists	  were	  caught	  unprepared,	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  spontaneity	  of	  the	  strikes,	  and	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  changing	  attitude	  of	  the	  state	  towards	  labor	  disputes.	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  Korean	  industrialists	  relied	  on	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  military	  state	  to	  crack	  strikes.	  Fearing	  that	  labor	  strikes	  might	  had	  been	  instigated	  by	  communist	  agents	  from	  the	  North,	  the	  Rhee	  and	  Park	  regime	  were	  once	  recklessly	  crush	  labor	  strikes	  without	  hesitation.	  However,	  the	  Chun	  Doo	  Hwan	  regime	  was	  more	  ambivalent	  about	  the	  suppression	  of	  workers.	  Facing	  the	  growing	  voice	  of	  democracy,	  Chun’s	  party	  promised	  democratic	  elections	  and	  constitutional	  reforms.	  The	  struggling	  regime	  was	  reluctant	  to	  repress	  strikes	  in	  the	  same	  way	  its	  predecessors	  did.	  	  So,	  the	  Chun	  chose	  a	  hands-­‐off	  position	  on	  labor-­‐relations,	  while	  gave	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  promise	  wage	  increase	  and	  improvement	  of	  benefit,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  hired	  thugs	  to	  disrupt	  voting,	  union	  registration,	  and	  other	  labor	  activities.	  	  	  	  	  	  Soon	  after	  the	  short-­‐term	  effort	  to	  buy	  off	  workers,	  the	  employers	  were	  considering	  long-­‐term	  strategy	  for	  labor	  relations.	  They	  realized	  that	  collective	  actions	  were	  needed	  to	  confront	  militancy	  labor	  movement	  and	  independent	  unionism.	  Thus,	  they	  strengthened	  Korean	  Employers	  Association	  to	  meet	  the	  changing	  industrial	  relations	  of	  the	  country.	  According	  to	  Jun	  and	  Sheldon,	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membership	  of	  the	  KEF	  rose	  from	  295	  firms	  to	  361	  from	  1986	  to	  1991.	  In	  1989,	  the	  Consultative	  Body	  for	  Business	  Organizations	  was	  established	  and	  in	  1990,	  the	  Council	  for	  National	  Economy	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  was	  established	  (KEF).	  In	  1989,	  the	  KEF	  formed	  the	  Council	  of	  Korean	  Employers	  Organization	  (CKEO)	  to	  strengthen	  the	  employer	  voice	  to	  government	  (Jun	  and	  Sheldon	  2006;	  Koo	  2001).	  In	  response	  to	  the	  changing	  socio-­‐political	  environment,	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  chose	  to	  strengthen	  the	  peak	  employer	  association.	  	  	  	  	  	  To	  curb	  unrestrained	  labor	  militancy	  and	  the	  cut	  the	  wave	  of	  work	  stoppage,	  the	  KEF	  in	  1990	  announced	  the	  “No	  work,	  no	  pay”	  principle	  (Koo	  2001,	  KEF).	  When	  Kim	  Young-­‐Sam	  came	  to	  power	  in	  1993,	  he	  initiated	  participatory	  labor	  policies.	  In	  1993,	  a	  tripartite	  forum	  was	  formed	  (Jun	  and	  Sheldon	  2006).	  The	  Kim	  Young-­‐Sam	  government	  managed	  to	  invite	  the	  FKTU	  and	  the	  KEF	  on	  the	  bargaining	  table	  and	  both	  agreed	  on	  a	  wage	  increase	  rate.	  Both	  sides	  agreed	  to	  limit	  the	  wage	  increase	  within	  the	  4.7%-­‐8.9%	  range	  in	  1993	  and	  within	  the	  5.0%-­‐8.7%	  in	  1994	  (Han	  et	  al	  2008).	  Yet	  centralized	  collective	  bargaining	  was	  discontinued	  after	  1994.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  tripartite	  wage	  bargaining	  greatly	  improved	  the	  external	  status	  of	  the	  KEF.	  With	  the	  official	  role	  in	  the	  tripartite	  bargaining,	  the	  association	  could	  then	  declare	  itself	  to	  be	  the	  representational	  body	  of	  employers	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  independent,	  non-­‐conforming	  KCTU	  created	  challenges	  to	  the	  KEF,	  but	  also	  created	  conditions	  for	  the	  KEF	  to	  maintain	  cohesion	  among	  its	  members.	  The	  FKTU’s	  continued	  accommodative	  attitude	  towards	  the	  state	  and	  capital	  helped	  the	  KEF	  acquire	  its	  external	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  national	  center	  of	  industrial	  relations	  where	  it	  could	  contribute	  through	  representation	  and	  lobbying.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	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KCTU’s	  militancy	  encouraged	  the	  KEF	  to	  develop	  its	  operational	  expertise	  in	  coordinating	  and	  supporting	  members	  in	  collective	  bargaining,	  and	  in	  the	  process	  helped	  the	  KEF	  develop	  cohesion	  among	  large	  chaebols	  (Jun	  and	  Sheldon	  2006).	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  see	  the	  changing	  industrial	  relations	  state-­‐labor	  relations	  created	  new	  incentives	  for	  the	  Korean	  business	  to	  organize.	  The	  empowerment	  of	  labor	  forced	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  to	  invest	  on	  business	  associations	  to	  collectively	  deal	  with	  labor	  unrests	  and	  to	  create	  an	  employer-­‐wide	  interest	  group	  to	  lobbying	  on	  pro-­‐employer	  organization.	  The	  alterative	  of	  coordinative	  and	  participatory	  labor	  policies	  all	  have	  created	  incentives	  for	  the	  employers	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  business	  organizations,	  especially	  the	  peak	  association	  in	  the	  center.	  	  	  	  
The	  Financial	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Tripartite	  Commission	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	  entirely	  changed	  the	  business-­‐state	  power	  dynamics	  in	  South	  Korea.	  The	  IMF	  involvement	  in	  the	  crisis	  created	  a	  window	  for	  reforms	  and	  changes	  that	  were	  too	  politically	  costly	  in	  the	  Roh	  Tae	  Woo	  and	  Kim	  Young	  Sam	  regime.	  Under	  the	  pressure	  of	  the	  IMF,	  reforms	  in	  industrial	  restructuring,	  specialization,	  financial	  transparency,	  corporate	  governance	  could	  finally	  go	  through.	  Amongst	  the	  various	  dimensions	  of	  the	  economic	  reform,	  the	  IMF-­‐mandated	  labor	  reform	  which	  included	  the	  abolishment	  of	  life-­‐time	  employment	  and	  labor	  flexibility	  was	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  implement.	  There	  were	  vehement	  oppositions	  of	  the	  labor	  flexibility	  and	  corporate	  restructure	  reform.	  	  	  	  	  	  Given	  such	  difficulties,	  the	  Kim	  Dae-­‐Jung	  regime	  wanted	  to	  implement	  neoliberal	  labor	  policies	  through	  social	  dialogue.	  In	  January	  1997,	  the	  Korean	  Tripartite	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Commission	  was	  created	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  structural	  reform	  through	  social	  pacts.	  The	  Commission	  was	  composed	  of	  representatives	  from	  the	  government,	  the	  KEF	  on	  the	  business	  side,	  and	  both	  the	  FKTU	  and	  KCTU	  on	  the	  labor	  side.	  On	  the	  labor	  side,	  the	  peak	  unions	  demanded	  the	  legality	  of	  multiple	  unions	  in	  the	  enterprise,	  while	  the	  businesses	  demanded	  a	  flexible	  labor	  market.	  In	  February,	  the	  Commission	  agreed	  on	  the	  legalization	  of	  layoff	  to	  promote	  restructuring,	  while	  the	  government	  promised	  to	  enhance	  the	  national	  social	  security	  network	  and	  to	  improve	  basic	  labor	  rights,	  including	  allowing	  unions	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  activities,	  and	  the	  chaebols	  agreed	  to	  make	  their	  finance	  more	  transparent	  (Han	  et	  al	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  March	  1998,	  Kim	  Dae-­‐Jung	  promulgated	  the	  Tripartite	  Commission	  law	  through	  a	  presidential	  decree	  (Han	  et	  al	  2008;	  Jun	  and	  Scheldon	  2006).	  Since	  then,	  the	  institutional	  status	  of	  the	  commission	  has	  been	  raised	  and	  the	  Tripartite	  Commission	  has	  become	  a	  permanent	  social	  dialogue	  body.	  In	  1999,	  the	  Act	  on	  Establishment	  and	  Operation	  of	  the	  Korean	  Tripartite	  Commission	  was	  passed	  at	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  The	  Commission	  met	  at	  least	  once	  a	  year.	  In	  March	  1998,	  three	  subcommittees	  were	  set	  up:	  economic	  reform,	  employment	  policies,	  and	  labor	  relations.	  Gradually,	  the	  Commission	  has	  become	  more	  institutionalized	  and	  sophisticated	  (Han	  et	  al	  2008;	  Jun	  and	  Scheldon	  2006).	  	  	  	  	  	  Regardless	  of	  these	  achievements,	  the	  transition	  towards	  societal	  corporatism	  has	  been	  difficult.	  Consensus	  between	  business,	  state,	  and	  labor	  was	  difficult	  to	  reach	  and	  the	  strength	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Commission	  has	  always	  been	  dependent	  on	  changes	  in	  power	  relations	  between	  the	  state,	  business,	  and	  labor.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Tripartite	  Commission	  created	  a	  forum	  of	  exchange	  of	  ideas	  and	  bargaining.	  The	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Commission	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  Korean	  Employers	  Association	  as	  a	  peak	  business	  association	  to	  represent	  the	  entire	  business	  class	  and	  act	  as	  one	  collective	  body.	  The	  institutional	  structure	  of	  the	  Korean	  Tripartite	  Commission	  created	  new	  incentives	  and	  selective	  benefits	  for	  the	  businesses	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  national	  level	  peak	  business	  association.	  	  	  
Party	  politics	  and	  Business	  Associations	  	  	  	  	  We	  might	  wonder,	  given	  the	  experience	  in	  Europe	  and	  Taiwan,	  what	  roles	  did	  political	  parties	  play	  in	  the	  transformation	  of	  business	  associations	  in	  South	  Korea?	  Interestingly,	  the	  political	  parties	  in	  South	  Korea,	  unlike	  this	  counterparts	  in	  Taiwan,	  played	  only	  a	  very	  marginal	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  business	  association.	  The	  question	  is	  why	  is	  it	  so.	  In	  the	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  why	  the	  political	  parties	  did	  not	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  business	  association	  in	  South	  Korea.	  I	  argue	  that	  because	  of	  the	  unique	  political	  reality,	  the	  political	  parties	  were	  not	  organized	  along	  class	  lines.	  Political	  completion	  remained	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  strongman	  politics.	  Ideology-­‐based	  party	  competition	  had	  not	  emerged	  in	  the	  1990s	  in	  South	  Korea.	  Thus	  political	  parties	  play	  only	  a	  minor	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  South	  Korea.	  	  	  	  	  	  Democratization	  invites	  party	  politics	  and	  electoral	  competition.	  As	  Martin	  and	  Swank	  suggest,	  party	  politics	  is	  a	  cohesive	  or	  divisive	  force	  in	  business	  interest	  organization,	  depending	  on	  the	  electoral	  system.	  A	  winner-­‐takes-­‐all	  majoritarian	  tends	  to	  create	  a	  two-­‐party	  system,	  which	  tends	  to	  cultivate	  factionalism	  and	  division	  within	  the	  business	  community,	  since	  both	  parties	  are	  catch-­‐all	  parties	  and	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they	  both	  want	  to	  influence	  and	  maximize	  political	  support	  from	  the	  business	  class.	  So	  a	  two-­‐party	  system	  tends	  to	  create	  a	  divisive	  and	  pluralist	  business	  interest	  organization.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  parliamentary	  proportional	  representational	  system	  tends	  to	  cultivate	  a	  united	  business	  association	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  since	  a	  proportional	  representational	  system	  tends	  to	  cultivate	  a	  multi-­‐party	  system	  with	  ideological	  differentiation,	  making	  a	  rightist	  liberal	  party	  focusing	  the	  votes	  of	  the	  capitalists	  and	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  more	  likely	  (Martin	  and	  Swank	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Since	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Sixth	  Republic	  in	  1987,	  the	  Koreans	  adopted	  a	  mixed	  electoral	  system.	  The	  presidential	  election	  has	  been	  conducted	  by	  majoritarian	  winner-­‐takes-­‐all	  mechanism,	  while	  the	  National	  Assembly,	  the	  unicameral	  legislative	  body	  in	  South	  Korea,	  has	  been	  elected	  by	  a	  three-­‐fourths	  majoritarian,	  and	  one-­‐fourth	  proportional	  representation	  (Kim	  2000).	  Regardless	  of	  the	  proportionality	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  election,	  since	  the	  presidential	  election	  was	  conducted	  solely	  by	  majoritarian	  vote	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  delegates	  is	  elected	  by	  majoritarian	  mechanism.	  Thus,	  we	  would	  expect	  an	  emergence	  of	  a	  two	  party	  system	  and	  the	  parties	  would	  naturally	  compete	  for	  the	  support	  and	  votes	  of	  the	  businesses,	  creating	  a	  divisive	  force	  for	  the	  business	  to	  unite	  as	  one	  singular	  national	  business	  association.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  empirics	  interestingly	  are	  different	  from	  the	  prediction.	  Party	  competition	  in	  Korea	  throughout	  the	  democratization	  process	  did	  not	  create	  a	  sharp	  divide	  in	  business	  association.	  What	  is	  more	  intriguing	  is	  that	  none	  of	  the	  parties	  during	  the	  1990s	  were	  openly	  aligned	  with	  the	  business	  class,	  with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  the	  short-­‐lived	  United	  National	  Party	  led	  by	  Chung	  Ju-­‐yong,	  the	  chairman	  of	  
Aaron	  Tsang	  Political	  Science	  Undergraduate	  Honor	  Thesis	  	  
	  
63	  
Hyundai.	  As	  Kim	  Byung-­‐Kook	  suggests,	  there	  was	  little	  class	  politics	  or	  urban-­‐rural	  divide	  in	  Korean	  politics,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  and	  party	  politics	  seems	  to	  play	  a	  minor,	  if	  any,	  role	  in	  business	  politics	  in	  South	  Korea	  (Kim	  2000;	  Kim	  et	  al	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Interestingly,	  as	  scholars	  like	  Kim	  suggests,	  the	  democratization	  process	  in	  South	  Korea	  did	  not	  create	  a	  great	  realignment	  of	  interest	  and	  political	  power,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Taiwan.	  Class	  division	  was	  not	  reflected	  in	  electoral	  politics.	  The	  militant	  labor	  movement	  created	  a	  workers’	  party,	  the	  Rodongdang,	  but	  the	  party	  was	  historically	  marginal	  in	  electoral	  politics	  and	  could	  only	  win	  seats	  in	  the	  legislative	  branch,	  through	  the	  proportional	  representation	  mechanism.	  The	  Workers	  Party	  never	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  presidential	  elections	  (Kim	  2000).	  The	  class	  cleavage,	  which	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  institutional	  argument,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  apply	  in	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Korea.	  	  	  	  	  	  Besides,	  none	  of	  the	  major	  political	  parties	  were	  openly	  aligned	  with	  the	  business	  class	  or	  the	  working	  class.	  The	  politicians	  avoided	  programmatic	  commitments	  and	  there	  were	  little	  ideological	  difference	  among	  the	  candidates.	  The	  society	  was	  “depoliticized,”	  because	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Voters	  refused	  to	  distinguish	  between	  redistributive	  social	  democracy	  with	  brutal	  Stalinism	  (BK	  Kim	  2000).	  	  	  	  	  	  Moreover,	  there	  was	  little	  no	  rural-­‐urban	  divide	  either.	  As	  Kim	  suggests,	  the	  national	  education	  and	  the	  media	  closed	  the	  rural-­‐urban	  gap.	  Through	  these	  channels,	  the	  rural	  areas	  are	  culturally	  connected	  to	  the	  urban	  areas.	  Besides,	  with	  close	  kinship	  ties	  between	  the	  population	  and	  the	  rural	  areas,	  there	  was	  no	  independent	  rural	  cultural	  identity,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  significance	  in	  voting	  pattern	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between	  the	  rural	  areas	  and	  the	  urban	  areas.	  The	  rapid	  urbanization	  blurred	  the	  cultural	  identity	  of	  the	  countryside	  (Kim	  2000).	  	  	  	  	  	  Without	  significant	  partisan	  divide,	  electoral	  politics	  was	  a	  game	  of	  personal	  charisma	  and	  regionalism.	  Voters	  tend	  to	  support	  candidate	  from	  their	  region.	  For	  example,	  voters	  from	  Yongnam	  supported	  Kim	  Young-­‐sam	  and	  voters	  from	  Honam	  supported	  Kim	  Dae-­‐Jung	  (BK	  Kim	  2000).	  With	  personal	  charisma	  and	  regionalism	  playing	  such	  an	  important	  role,	  party	  merges	  and	  splits	  were	  common.	  Party	  remained	  electoral	  instruments	  of	  politicians	  and	  did	  not	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  electoral	  politics	  (BK	  Kim	  2000).	  	  	  	  	  	  Unlike	  Taiwan,	  where	  political	  cleavages	  were	  clear	  along	  ethnic	  lines	  and	  on	  policies	  towards	  the	  Mainland,	  there	  were	  little	  clear	  political	  cleavages	  that	  separated	  the	  Korean	  electorate	  in	  the	  1990s.	  While	  the	  political	  influence	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  was	  not	  as	  engrained	  as	  that	  of	  the	  KMT,	  political	  parties	  did	  not	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  mobilizing	  opposition	  and	  demand	  democracy.	  A	  culture	  of	  strongman	  politics	  remained	  in	  the	  Korean	  political	  culture	  until	  recently.	  Since	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  politicians	  have	  not	  been	  anchored	  in	  political	  parties,	  the	  investment	  on	  long-­‐term	  partners	  was	  not	  worthwhile,	  therefore,	  we	  did	  not	  see	  that	  party	  politics	  playing	  a	  crucial	  divisive	  role,	  despite	  the	  majoritarian	  electoral	  system	  in	  the	  republic.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  see	  that	  in	  response	  to	  the	  changing	  political	  environment,	  the	  Korean	  businesses	  have	  strengthened	  the	  existing	  business	  associations	  and	  became	  more	  active	  in	  the	  public	  to	  protect	  their	  collective	  interests	  and	  economic	  status.	  State	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actions	  created	  direct	  incentives	  for	  the	  organization	  of	  business	  actors.	  The	  state,	  in	  this	  case,	  acted	  as	  a	  negative	  yet	  cohesive	  force	  for	  business	  association.	  	  	  	  	  	  Besides	  the	  impact	  of	  changing	  conditions	  on	  business	  interest	  organization,	  the	  changing	  labor	  regime	  has	  also	  created	  incentives	  for	  the	  businesses	  to	  organize.	  The	  changing	  industrial	  relations	  have	  created	  a	  new	  role	  for	  the	  business	  peak	  association	  in	  collective	  bargaining	  and	  political	  participation	  in	  social	  dialogue	  institution.	  The	  impact	  of	  labor	  militancy	  on	  business	  interest	  organization	  should	  not	  be	  neglected.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  paper	  shows	  that	  although	  the	  developmental	  state	  dominated	  the	  economic	  scene	  in	  both	  countries	  during	  the	  authoritarian	  developmental	  era,	  yet	  the	  transition	  of	  business	  associations	  followed	  very	  different	  paths	  when	  the	  two	  countries	  underwent	  the	  process	  of	  democratization	  and	  economic	  liberalization,.	  The	  Korean	  businesses,	  in	  response	  to	  labor	  militancy	  and	  hostile	  state	  actions,	  chose	  to	  strengthen	  the	  national	  peak	  business	  associations	  to	  effectively	  conduct	  collective	  actions.	  Democratization	  changed	  the	  strategy	  of	  the	  politicians,	  pressuring	  them	  to	  distance	  themselves	  for	  the	  chaebols.	  Democratization	  also	  increased	  the	  political	  cost	  of	  labor	  suppression,	  forcing	  the	  businesses	  to	  coordinate	  in	  response	  to	  the	  growing	  militancy	  of	  the	  labor	  force.	  Democratization,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Korea,	  altered	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  balance	  of	  collective	  action	  among	  the	  Korean	  businessmen,	  making	  collective	  action	  more	  urgent	  and	  necessary.	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  In	  contrast,	  democratization	  increased	  the	  organizational	  cost	  of	  the	  Taiwanese	  businesses.	  The	  growing	  electoral	  competition	  created	  political	  incentives	  for	  the	  ruling	  KMT	  party	  to	  co-­‐opt	  individual	  business	  groups	  and	  distribute	  political	  rent	  for	  electoral	  support.	  The	  rent-­‐seeking	  behavior	  of	  individual	  business	  groups	  undermines	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  united	  peak	  business	  association.	  	  	  	  	  Besides,	  the	  relatively	  sophisticated	  party	  politics	  effectively	  created	  a	  political	  divisive	  force	  for	  the	  organization	  of	  a	  national,	  singular	  business	  association.	  Chen’s	  struggle	  for	  domination	  and	  control	  escalated	  the	  status	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Small-­‐and-­‐Medium-­‐sized	  Enterprises	  and	  the	  China	  National	  Association	  of	  Industry	  and	  Commerce,	  making	  national	  peak	  association	  more	  pluralistic	  and	  unification	  more	  difficult	  (Huang	  2004).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Yet	  it	  seems	  too	  early	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  South	  Korean	  political	  economy	  is	  heading	  towards	  a	  corporatist,	  coordinative	  structure,	  while	  the	  Taiwanese	  political	  economy	  heading	  towards	  a	  pluralist,	  liberal	  direction.	  National	  level	  tripartite	  institutions	  have	  been	  evolving	  and	  consolidating	  in	  South	  Korea,	  yet	  up	  to	  this	  day,	  the	  business	  and	  labor	  actors	  have	  not	  reached	  any	  consensus	  on	  labor	  and	  social	  policies.	  The	  institution	  of	  social	  dialogue	  between	  labor	  and	  capital	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  embedded	  in	  the	  society	  and	  in	  the	  political	  economy.	  The	  tripartite	  commission	  is	  an	  artifact	  of	  the	  state	  and	  might	  not	  be	  sustained	  with	  a	  change	  in	  political	  interest	  of	  the	  politicians.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Besides,	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  developmental	  state	  creates	  obstacles	  for	  an	  effective	  national	  scale	  social	  dialogue	  institution.	  The	  resilience	  of	  the	  corporatist	  peak	  labor	  union,	  the	  FKTU,	  has	  difficulty	  for	  collective	  actions	  of	  the	  labor	  class,	  in	  turn	  has	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undermined	  the	  possibility	  for	  coordination	  between	  state,	  capital,	  and	  labor	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  	  	  	  	  	  Similarly,	  it	  seems	  too	  soon	  to	  generalize	  Taiwan	  a	  pluralist,	  liberal	  economy.	  Despite	  the	  competitiveness	  nature	  of	  the	  peak	  associations,	  there	  has	  been	  significant	  cooperation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  business	  community,	  or	  even	  tripartite	  communication	  (Kamimura	  2008).	  Many	  of	  the	  sectorial	  associations	  remained	  strong	  and	  the	  coordination	  regular.	  There	  are	  pluralistic	  and	  liberal	  elements	  in	  the	  political	  economy	  and	  in	  the	  business	  interest	  organization	  in	  Taiwan,	  but	  it	  might	  be	  too	  early	  to	  conclude	  that	  Taiwan	  has	  undergone	  a	  full	  transition	  to	  neoliberalism	  and	  economic	  pluralism	  in	  Taiwan.	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  paper	  has	  examined	  the	  politics	  behind	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  autonomous,	  national	  peak	  association.	  We	  see	  that	  the	  interaction	  between	  capital,	  labor,	  and	  the	  state	  has	  shaped	  the	  organizational	  structure	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  national	  association.	  Yet	  we	  have	  yet	  to	  see	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  national	  peak	  association	  and	  welfare	  and	  economic	  policies.	  More	  research	  has	  to	  be	  conducted	  to	  examine	  the	  possible	  the	  impact	  of	  business	  association	  as	  a	  social	  organization	  in	  economic	  and	  welfare	  policies.	  However,	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  analysis	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  more	  future	  research	  and	  studies	  on	  the	  political	  participation	  and	  policy	  impact	  of	  business	  associations	  in	  newly-­‐industrializing	  countries	  like	  South	  Korean	  and	  Taiwan.	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